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A Freedr.ADB of the Ai? 201 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Backgramul to th£ Stlll.iy 
1_1_1 General 
The Southern African Develo~nt Community (SAI.'IC) airlines are 
presently characterised by massive losses~ hea.,,.·y subsidies> low 
aircraft utilisation,. hea.,,.·y interest and capital repayments for 
aircraft procurement and other relate~ equipment,. overmanning,. lack 
of adequate skilled manpower in some areas,. generally management 
without a clearly laid down policy on the role of the airline in the 
national economy {SATCC & World Bank 1992 : 1-3). The economies of 
the SADC countries are suffering from chronic shortages of foreign 
currency to finance the required levels of imports of both raw 
materials and capi t.al investment. The average economic growth is 
below the rate of population growth. Most of the SADC countries are 
embarking on some sort of economic structural adjustment programmes 
supported by the World Bank and some Western donor countries. 
Some dynamic political changes are also taking place within the 
region following the collapse of communism in the former USSR. There 
are increasing moves towards democratisation of goverrunents and 
institutions within SADC countries. The population and donor agencies 
are increasingly demanding greater accountability and questioning some 
Government policies such as the heavy subsidies to national airlines 
which hardly benefit the population. 
1 
Genera.lly,. the pei:·fr.Jt~:nce <Jf r.i.b:·lines ii'fJ.11 over the world. in the pa.st 
foll'r· yee:rs r..1r sr.; { 1990 - 1993} has bee·n dismaL Th.is is the Cii'fJ.Se with 
11nder the previm.lf:i bila.teral structure a.s ex~~la.ined. below. 
20-21) ex:plr.s.irl.B tha.t i!i.irlines i"L1 the U8A have 
becr.Jming pi:·ec.:1:l·imJS. A simila:r· sit"'l3J!S.tir.tn wa.s sa.id tr.; ha.ve emerged in 
Ga.na.r.lr.J .. Losses or ba:nkrl:r.pt..cies were reported. i·r, Austra.lia. a:nrl Mew 
Zea.land. All these .:1.irli"t1es a:re i".J"l" were f"t·ou, r..:r.JU"ntries which ha.ve 
Perfo"Z:""ttia:nce of r.d-rlines in those r.;i:,'1.ratries whei:·e the P?:'F.:r•.rious 
bila.tera.1 f".-tructu:re still exists wr.i.s sirrtilarly ba.d. According to 
Pocock ( 1993a. :: 8) the 208 members r_,f IATA which ca.rr:y 96 per Cl:mt of 
the ~ .. 1orld"s t""C"a:ffic hr.i:ve r..:ollectively lr..1st .. aJ .. -r.m:t us:i10 billio·n on 
fun.ong the rea.so·ns for the l-:-..1sses wa.s the Gulf wa:r· a:nd the o"Ubseque·nt 
Although some airlines such as British Airways and Singapore 
International Airlines made some profit in 1990-1993 (see Chapter 3), 
the following examples will illustrate the widespread nature of poor 
financial performance of world airlines. 
a. In the first half of 1993, the Austrian flag carriers~ losses 
were US$29 million., more than double from the previous year, 
1993 :: 27}~ 
b. Lufthansa had accumulated losses of nearly US$200 million for two 
years from 1991-1993 (Aerospace - May 1993 :5). 
c. Air France had accumulated deficits from 1990 of 450 million 
pounds {Sterling)~ of which 320 million pounds was in 1992. A 
heavy loss was expected in 1993. This is despite the fact that 
Air France receive Government subsidies {Aerospace - March 
1993:6). 
d. TAP - Air Portugal was estimated to make losses of up to US$335 
million for 1992 calendar year. In April 1993~ the airline was 
unable to pay the full salaries for all its 10 000 employees 
{Flight International 19 - 25 May 1993 : 21). 
e. Air Canada reported a net loss of (.'$~'93 million {US$230 million') 
for the first quarter of 1993. The Airline had plans to make a 
major corporate re-organisation~ which could result in up to 1.500 
job losses by the end of 1993 (Flight International 19 - 25 May 
1993 : 20). 
f. Quantas made a net loss of A$377 million {US$250 million) for the 
l'"ear to 30 June 1993~ after writing off costs of absorbing 
Australian Airlines {Flight International 3 - 9 November 1993 : 
3 
g. .Japr.s.n Ai-r·li·nes (.JAL} ma.de o. ·ct-et loss r..;.f Yen. 44 billion (U8$378 
1nillio·cl) fol:· the yea.r end.i-ctg 31 tw:cch 1993. The Ail::·line TE!b.de a. 
net loss of Yen 50 billio·n fo'"!" the fisco.l yeo:r· 1992. The Ail:·lb1e, 
;:;. Yen 200 billio·ci. c11.t i-£1 plarrned. i-r!".,estme·nt {Flight International 
h. KLM U"l.l:l.de o. loss r..;.f m.r..;.re tha-rt U8$300 million i·n 1992, following 
r.s. E..'T!l.l:l.11 p'"!"ofit il'i. the i:~"l·evir..;.ll.S yea:r. The Airli·ne wr.s.s reported. 
- .Jr.lly 1993 : 9}. 
i. Phoenix, Arizona based Stat.es - West Airlines collapsed in earll'· 
October 1993. The Airline had entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in December 1992 {Flight International 20 - 26 October 
1993 : 14). 
j. Air Zimbabwe made a loss of Z.$71.5 million in the year ended 30 
June 1991. Total revenue was Z$275.5 million {Air Zimbabwe~ 12th 
Annual Report, 1990/91 { 1992: 12). 
Deregulation 
Formerly, regulation was justified on the grounds that an 
unregulated airline industry, because of the relatively low entry 
barriers:- would result in intense or uneconomic competition which 
would result in chronic financial instability. Consequently the 
The air transport industr?l is undergoing profound changes 
throughout the World due to the abandonment of the fundamental 
assumptions about the need for regulation. There is a body of thought. 
that suggests that the protection which the industry received b~· 
regulation was unnecessary and that it has~ in fact~ worked against 
the industry·s own longer term interests. The argument is that by 
being protected~ the industry did not see the need to respond to free 
market forces leading to inefficiency and waste. Tariffs were kept 
unnecessarily high keeping traffic levels down (Doganis 1992:51-52}. 
Deregulation started with the United States domestic operations 
in 1978 followed by countries such as Canada, the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand (Wheatcroft 1990:240'). This resulted in rela..~ation of 
controls over tariffs, capacity and market aCC"ess. 
One result of deregulation has been the emergence and domination 
of the market b1r a small number of '¥'ery large airlines or ·mega-
carriers· in the USA as a result of mergers and takeovers. An 
oligopolistic industry with four airlines carrying over 90 per cent 
of the passenger traffic emerged (Wheatcroft 1992:1). Many airlines 
in the USA have gone bankrupt. Examples are Braniff whose operations 
were severely affected by new low-cost operators who were allowed to 
compete for traffic on their more profitable routes {Transport 
Tutorial Association 1984: 109). A more recent example is Pan AM which 
went into liquidation. 
5 
a.s to concentra.t..e theil:· resrft.l.rces a.nd efforts on rm.:tt..es which they a.re 
more p:c·oper ly e<;flJ.ipped to sel:"J'e, '-1:c1rl o·n whir..:h they fa.ce theil:· gz·e;:,.test 
coui:petition (T-!·a:nE..-pr..srl Tutorial Associatir..sn 1984 :: 110). As a. result 
of th.is, same cr,;mrro.xclities "o11ith a. lm~ t..'l"a.ffic level b.o.ve beern separated 
Som.e E.r-riib.lle-"!" feerler 
airlines ha"'.7e emel:·ged to fill the g~.p crea.ted tJY cr.mnecting these 
·netwo-z:·k.s . 
Many see deregulation as being in the interests of the consumer 
since tariffs are generally lowered, the choice of carriers is wider 
and many routes have been opened up in the era of free competition. 
From USA,. Canada,. the United Kingdom,. Australia and New Zealand,. 
deregulation has spread to Europe and Asia. Moves towards 
deregulation have been slow to be adopted in Africa. South Africa 
deregulated its domestic operations and domestic d·eregulation is under 
consideration in India (Wheatcroft 1992:1). In international 
operations,. South Africa,. like all SAilC countries as well as other 
African countries adopt protectionist attitudes {Brits and Smuts 
1992: 41) -
6 
Globa.li.sa.ti.an 
An important recent feature within the airline industry is the 
emergence of multinational airlines. These changes were initiated by 
widespread moves in developed countries~ governments to relinquish 
ownership of national flag carrier.s {Wheatcroft 1990: 241). Private 
ownership of airlines reduced the aggressive promotion of purely 
national short-term aviation interests which generall)· characterised 
most past policies. Wheatcroft (1992:1) stat·es that over 40 airlines 
in as manJ,o· different countries are invohred in the transformation of 
national airlines to private ownership. World air traffic in the 
1990s were predicted to be dominated by pri,,.·ate airlines with no 
direct go,,.·ernment interest. This was predicted to contribute 
significantl:?i>· to a lessening of protectionist attitudes in 
international aviation policies and the acceptance of foreign 
ownership. There are about 24 airlines in different countries which 
have substantial foreign ownership (Wheatcroft 1992a : 2). Wheatcroft 
(1992:1) believes that concentration and globalisation are inevitable 
in the airline industry. This is largely due to the huge marketing 
advantages of ven· large airlines in a deregulated environment. With 
giant airlines dominating t.he future airline industry, the large 
number of smaller airlines were predicted to operate on feeder routes 
and in niche markets. Wheatcroft states that these d~velopments will 
be in the best long term interests of the travelling public. This 
would result from the emergence of an efficient and profitable, stable 
oligopolistic structure similar to that of other major industries such 
as chemicals,. motor vehicles,. oil,. insurance,. aircraft manufacturing 
7 
a:nd meta.ls. 
airlines of th.e d.e-1elr.spi·,tg world wa.s ex:pected. 
Mot everyr.;ne shb.res Wher.1.tr..:roft • s viF.:".as r.;n glr..1ba.lisr.1.tion r.s:nd 
concent rat i01:1. 
of de?:·egu.lr.s.t io11 r.s.re la:r·ge ly r.s.ct i·,ig r.ro.t of self interests by fr.s:•1r.s1.lring 
to allow co·ca.SOJI1F.:fl"s to b-1::-nefit f:~rcfi the withd""£·awa.l of the inefficient 
er.s.id to ha:ve tor.s uv:s.:ny ifUk.1F.:rrfer..::t. io·.n.s thr.1.t a. perfect mr.J.rket could not 
exist. 
Pocock (1993a:8} recognises that air transport is required'to among 
other things'to to fulfil the demand for economic and social 
integration~ facilitate regional economic development~ serve tourism 
and establish air (rornmunication) links to the remote or less 
developed areas with low traffic demand. Concentration would result 
in a monopoly situation which would be inconsistent with the need to 
preserve consumer choice~ the operator~s lack of local knowledge~ lack 
of technology transfer and foreign exchange drain. 
Lucking (1993:20) argues that airline competition under the 
deregulated environment in the USA'to Canada'to Australia~ New Zealand and 
South Africa is not working. The reasons given are that competition 
in passenger transport leads to excessive capacity~ discounting~ 
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ca.pa.city~ 
Although some extra: capacity may be required to accommodat·e the 
extra traffic generated by reduced tariffs.. the total capacit?,t· 
available is often greater than demand. Carriers then introduce sub-
economic fares resulting in chronic losses. 
It is against the background discussed above that strategies to 
turnaround SADC airlines are being sought. 
1.2 Limitation of the Study 
The study is limited to the original ten SAIC countries which 
comprise Angola,. Botswana.. Lesotho,. Malawi-:- Mozambique,. Namibia .. 
Swaziland.,. Tanzania,. Zambia and Zimba~"e. South Africa.. which 
recentll'· joined SAI.C (_1994).. is e~:cluded from this study. South 
Africa is different from the ten SADC states in a number of respects. 
It has a comparath.··ely huge,. diversified and very sophisticated 
economy whos-e Gross National Product is: many times that of the 
c-ombined SAI'C st.ates. South Africa,. therefore,. does not experience 
some of the per...'lJ.liar problems of SADC states whir..:h include tiny 
airlines with E.'Tll.all domestic ma.rr..ets arl.fl experiencing comparatively 
huge fina.ncial arl.fl ecorar.smic losses. 
1.3 °'1erview O"f SADC Ai.rlines 
The ten SADC cr.sura.tries F.s.re all operating thei'l" awrt small 
airlines. They F.s.'l"e all state owci.ed except "fr.sr Aero ZF.1.mt..1ia, which is 
privately awrted with the Zl!anbien Gr.JVe"t'ranent awning same shares. The 
approximately seventy aircra"ft in the SA.DC "fleet. comprise more than 
seventeen varieties (Soutb.ern A"frice.n Rcr..mam.ist 1988::3). This is at 
'-'· time when airli·ci.es "frr.nn the developed mvl newly irtdustrialised 
countries are rationalisit'lg their operatiortS and through mergers and 
takeovers, for&ing large 01w.:rating u:ca.its. This is in respr .. mse to 
worldwide mr.JVes tr.swF.1.rds deregulation anrl the re::.'ll.ltirtg intense 
competition as well as recessir.sn. The large r.sperating units bt:mefit 
from economies of scale in such e.rel!l.B F.113 ma.irttel'l8.l'tee, training and 
pt.lrt::hasing of spares, aircraft and other equipmF.::nt. 
The SAOO a.i.rli.n.es serve the rJr.nDF.:Btic, regional and 
intercontinental ma.rr..ets. The dr..smest ic mark.et is ge·cteral ly served by 
smaller short - rF.1.nge aircraft sw::h as the BAF..: 146, the De Havilland 
Twin Otter a:ca.d the Fokker 50. The regiona.l mark.et whir..:h include SADC 
and some A"f rican cr.Jm"dries outside SADC are served tr~ medium range 
aircraft 5ll.Ch as the Br.seirta 737 and ATR - 42 and in same few cases by 
nar'l"ow br..sdied lr.s·ng ra.rtge aircraft such as the Br.seirta 707. The 
intercontinental ma.Z"kets are gera.erally served by long - range wide 
bodied ai'l"craft such 1!113 the Br.seirtg 767 anrl DC - 10 - 30. 
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The SADC airlirte inrbJ.St.ry is tightly regi2lated. All schedUled 
passenger services are r.JJierated by rfb.tir.mal a.irlira.es. Air trarLBPOrt 
is a critice.lly im,pr.1rlarLt fona of com1Wxrticatiora. especially in 
countries like Ta.ra.zania wb.ich have pr.Jar sarface tranBPOrt facilities 
(sea, road and railway B';Btem.s) Marl cauca.tries affected t.r; wars such 
ae Angola and Mozmnbigue. T"t"a:ve l between some SADC Cr.P.ll'a.tries are only 
possible t.sy air SJx:h l!l.B frr.mt Caesr.1tho to Tanzania. or Swazi.land to 
Artgola. In a bid to forge rfh.tioraal political, social and economic 
unity, SOll'te gr.JVerraw~:ft'lts have teTLded to regard air passenger transport 
a.s a public service which has to be ca"t"ried aut at any cost. Hence, 
some fares especially ora. drJmestic r.JPeratir.1ra.s were often tightly 
controlled resulting in t..eavy fiTl1.f.ncial losses (SATCC & World Bank 
1992:48). 
International traffic is regulat~ through a system of bilateral 
air services agreements. Although SADC political leaders emphasize 
the need for increased cooperation in various spheres, they have 
generally failed to translate the political rhetoric into practical 
cooperation, for example, SADC countries typically deny each other 
fifth freedom rights. This is despite the low aircraft utilization 
which was estimated to average about four hours a day or about a third 
of the flying time required to break even (The Southern African 
Economist _1988: 6) . One of the few cooperative successes were through 
the efforts of the Southern African Transport and Communications 
Commission {SATCC) to rationalise the schedules of SADC airlines. The 
number of flights per week between SADCC capitals increased from 114 
to 214 between 1984 to 1987 (The Southern African Economist 1988:5). 
11 
During the E?8.JDF.: time the rm.mber o'f cr.m:ca.ect.ions thrr.sugh .Johannesburg 
dropped f ram 169 to 122 per week-
The Political situa.tiort in Sr.su.th Africa ha.s radically char,,ged ira. 
the past few years_ A rt.eW Gr.Nernment 0£ Natir..m.a.l Unity led by the 
AMC· s Nelson Mandela was 'formed ira. t.i8:y 1994- It is nr.1 lr.1rtger a SADC 
objective to redw::e dependerll'.;y on Srftith Africa_ Tta.e high degree of 
integratir.1n of the SADC route network. with tb.B.t r.1f South Africa 
rem.a.ins_ !rt fa.ct, with the changed pc-.1litical sitl.l1.J.tion in th.at 
co1J.Tttry and with tta.e cOTasequertt err.1sion of internatir~.l isolation, 
South Africa. will irll'.;rease its i.mportara.ce as pa.rt of the SADC 
airlines· route ra.etwork_ Because r.1£ the strr.1ng historic links of 
Sr.su.th Africa with SADC ~r.nmtries, South Africa cr.1ntiro.ies to be a ms.jar 
destination for J18.Ssengers frr.nn SADC cm.zntries- The umch stronger, 
diversified and sr,;phisticated Sr.JU.th African ecorll'.JmY makes it a major 
destination fr.Jr passengers a.rtd 'freight to and fl:am. the Westerrt 
developed rl.8.tions- This will continue to reirtfr.Jrce .Johb:canesl".ro.rg a.s 
a. major hub irt Sr.JU.them Africa_ 
SADC governments appea.:1:· to be slr..Ml'Y grae.-ping the simple fact 
ttl.8.t there is need "for cbi!l.ra.ge_ Per ca.pit.a incomes within SADC are 
"falling (with the exceptirm r.J"f Br.Jtswan.B. and Mozambique), external debt 
is increasing and the scarce "foreign excharage is becoming even more 
scarce_ The gr.Nerranet'lts C1.il't rw lcmger afford to keep on propping up 
loss making parastatals especially airlines which take a significant 
bite irLto the sea.roe foreign exr.:haTage resr.rorces- Char..ge is, 
there-fore, inevita.ble _ One significF.i:ett c;lv.mge was the chara.ge from 
SADf'....C, a coordinat irtg mechartism tr.J SADC, a regional ecrmamic and 
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politica.l cr . m.smxnit..y~ Br.;ld l'lffldf e.-t.rr.1.t..egies are T'egnired to tlll"'n arr.ro:nd 
the preserLt urtBat is"f~.r.;t.,,.,,ey JN:::rlr.;~.I"tce r.;i: SA.DC ~.ir l in.es·· i·n ~.-n 
i-c1.Creasi-c,.gly hoe.-t.ile rJJ~'t"ati·cag er~irr.;nment ~ 
1.4 Object. i.ves of: the St-m:b 
1.4.1 lfai.n objective 
The main objective of the study is to develop from the literature 
strategies to turnaround the poor economic and financial performance 
of SADC airlines in general and Air Zimbabwe in particular. 
1.4.2 Subsidiary object.iYes 
The subsidiary objectives of the study are as follows: 
a. To carry out a literature research in order to derive ideal 
theoretical turnaround strategies for airlines. 
b. To study some airlines which have carried out successful 
turnarounds as well as an airline which has consistently 
maintained profitable operations for over twenty years so as to 
derive practical strategies which were or are being successfully 
employed. 
c. To carry out an analysis of SADC airlines namely to determine the 
weaknesses and strengths as well as opportunities and threats to 
SADC airlines. 
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L 5 Metb.odology 
A subject of this nature requires a huge amount of liter.ature and 
data collection. The sources of this information are described below. 
1.5.1 Airlines 
A lot 0£ infonr..ation on the ~erfonr.ance oi airlines can be 
obtained from their annual reports. It was,. therefore,. necessary to 
write to airlines all over the world req,u-esting for annual reports and 
any other literature on their airlines. 
Letters were sent to O'IJ"·er se"·enty airlines all over the world. 
More than a quarter of the airlines responded and t.heir names are 
listed in the acknowledgement. A lot of valuable information was 
received on the airlines that. responded. Often,. not only were the 
annual reports received but al.so additional general information such 
as on the history and general profile of the airlines. 
It was from an analysis of the airlines~ financial performance,. 
their operating .. .. ~ .J... "' .s&a&l.Svl.CS,. the chairman~s 
Reports and an!>'· other in.formation on the airlines t~at. the link 
between airline performance and strategies~ within the context of the 
operating en1..-iron:nent. and intern.al characteristics,. could be deduc-ed. 
Flight 
{ICAO) statistics ... 
of the 
lS9l:t 
ICP. • .f) ste.t ist ics l'1ee-r..l rJ.egree 
.,.,T:J.'l"iOll.s ~.i'l" l i"rc.es .... 
,.,.,,.  
. .,,, .... 
IATA/AFRICAN REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION (AFRAA}/AFRICAN 
CIVIL AVIATION COMMISSION (AFCAC) 
Attempts to obtain 1ATA/l+."FRAA/AFCAC statistics pro,,.·ed fruitless. 
This information,. if it had been obtained,. would also have suffered 
from similar drawbacks to 1 CAO statistics. This informatior: "rould 
hai.,.·e been useful in 'l.•'·erifiring the ICAO statistics. Howe'lr·er,. lacl:: of 
this data was not felt to be of critical imJ?Ortance sinc-e gr-eat.er 
reliance was made on .statistics from airline anm.~.al reports rather 
than ICAO. 
1_5_4 The Southern African 
Commission {SA'TCC} 
Transport and Communications 
SATCC,. based in Ma}?l.2to,. Mozambique,. has for a number of !fears 
been promoting closer regional cooperation in the field of transport 
and communications. A written !'E'ques.t. was m.ade for their views on the 
feasibility of a SAI.'iC:~ airline and amr progre:.ss or otherwise being made 
towards this end. 
SATCC assisted me with a document,. "The SA:DCC Airline Industr~· 
Study" dated March 1992~ compiled b~· the organisation in conjunction 
with t-he World Banl-:::. ?hi.s document proved valuable in providing 
comprehems:ive SADC airline and ot.h.er related statistics which could 
not be obtained £rom an.}l other sou~'""e. 
and a vast amount of useful info~ation was obtained. 
1. 5. 6 Interviews 
In looking into the i.ssues identified in this dissertation~ it 
was found necessary to approach S>::)ine organisations and indhdd•..Aa:s {l:;'h-c 
have some int.erest-s in the subject on hand. Those interviewed 
included representatives from airlines, travel agents ar.d fro::. SATCC. 
The names of the representatives are in-eluded in the acknowledg:ement. 
The specific discussions with each organisation or indhridual .are not 
included. 
1.6 E.~sition of the Study 
The research is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter 
outlines the m:air. focus of the rese.arch effort. In the second 
chapter, a literatur-e research is carried out. p-ertainir.g to the 
identificat.ion of the ideal strat.eg.ies for sU>....~'""ess of airlines. The 
a tool t.o .a..'1.al1rsa the ir.ternal environment. of SAI.'C airl!.r.:es. The 
McKinseJI· 7-5 framein""Ork suggests the components of organisational 
structure, strat·egy, style~ shared values 
(superordinate goals) and skills must. all fit together to make a 
strategy illi'Ork effectively. 
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The third cW:J.pt.er is a sturly r_.f British Air.tta.ys a.:nd Sc'-l.rtdirl8."'.,i~.1"t 
Airlira.e System which mar.le sa.cr..:essful tm:"'fir.f."E"i".Jm"tr.ls iti the e1.o1.rly 198fJs_ 
A sturr; of SirtgaJ--rJre Ira.tercatir.m.F.1.l Airlines, a crJCa.sisteca.tly "ISl"f"Jfitable 
Ail:·lira.e since 1972, is also r..:r.1.rried 01.zt_ 
airlines, pr1:J.ctical strr.1.:tegies whir..:h "I"e51l.lted in the SJl.Ccess r.J"f. the 
a.iz· lirtes a.re derived-
The fourth chapter is a derivation of pragmatic turnaround 
strategies for SADC airlines on the basis of the research in chapter 
2 and 3. The fifth chapter is a study of the internal environment of 
SADC airlines to determine their strengths and weaknesses as well as 
the opportunities and threats in the external environment. This 
allowed strategies to be developed to take advantage of the 
opportunities through organisational strengths while countering 
threats by the use of strengths and to address the weaknesses in order 
to take advantage of opportunities. Research is also carried out into 
work previously carried out on SADC airlines especially in the area 
of airline cooperation. The success or otherwise of previous 
cooperative efforts are examined with the view to avoiding short-
comings and to build on any success. 
In chapter 6,. the application of the prapatic strategies derived 
in chapter 4 are evaluated in view of the findings of the analysis of 
SADC airlines carried out in chapter 5. Chapter 7 concludes the 
study with a summary,. findings and recommendations. 
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2. THEORY/LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introdo:cti.an 
In this chapter .. a literature research is carried out with the 
view to coming up with .ideal strategies to turnaround the poor 
economic and financial performance of SAI'C airlines. This would 
assist in coming up with pragmatic strategies which could result in 
successful operations by SADC airlines. The possible turnaround 
strategies discussed are cost leadership .. differentiation and focus. 
The critical nature of effective management in the formulation and 
implementation of appropriate turnaround strategies is also dis-cussed. 
Once an appropriate strategy i.s identified.. it is necessary to 
ensure that it is effectively impl·emented. One conceptual model, 
namely the Mc-Kinsey 7-S model, is often used as a checklist in an 
attempt to ensure that an!r chosen strategy is effectively implemented. 
This model is discussed and would be used in chapter 5 to anal~·se the 
internal environment of SADC airlines to reveal weal-messes and 
strengths. 
2.2 Types of Turnaround Strategies 
Turnaround strategies are the activities undertaken to stop an 
org.anisational decline or downturn and stimulat·e an >..tpturn in it.s 
performance. The financial performance of SAI.'C national airlines is 
poor {SATCC & World Bank 1992 : 47J. Tne airlines .are incurring 
lf.l 
Table 2 .1 shows the financial performance of Air Zimbabwe in the 
decade from 1981/82 to 1990/91 financial years. The Airline 
consistently registered a loss despite receiving annual subsidies from 
the Government. 
The environment in which SADC airlines are operating is becoming 
increasingl?f more hostile with fierce competition from some well 
established carriers from the western developed nations such as Great 
Britain,. France .. Germany .. Switzerland,. the Netherlands, Italy .. Spain,. 
and Portugal. Table 2.2 shows the decline of SAI.~C nation.al airlines 
share of intercontinental (international to and from SADC} passenger 
traffic between 1987 - 1989 e'IJ·en before the SADC environment was made 
more open for foreign carriers. 
New African { 1995 : 24} confirms that African airlines (including 
SADC airlines} were meeting ferocious competition in today-s 
deregulated markets. European airlines were said to be holding 80 per 
cent of the traffic bet~--een Africa and Europe. O\.·er 1994, Africa-s 
passenger traffic was said to ha,..·e fallen by 4. 2 per cent while 
worldwide the nwnber of air travellers rose by 7 per cent. It could, 
t.heref ore.. be .argued whether it. is worth saving these airlines. 
However,. SADC airlines fulfil some important social~ economic,. 
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political and strategic needs as discussed in section 1.3 such that 
SADC Governments are unlikely tc contemplete such 8 strategy, unless 
if compelled to do so by donor agencies like the World Bank, as was 
The liquidation strategy will~ therefore, not be considered further. 
Hoffman (1989 : 46 - 57) studied seventeen previous rese8rches 
en corporate turnaround strategies. Most of the seventeen studies 
were carried out between 1951 and 1983 among United States 
manufacturing firms. Based on the research, Hoffman (1989 : 57 - 58) 
stages of implementing them. The first or preparatory stage involve 
restructuring an organisation'".s leadership and culture. This is 
followed by three short term .. fix'" stages which comprise cost 
reduction,. asset redeployment (sell assets,. close or relocate units) 
and selective product/market strategy (divesting products., increase 
prices; improve quality or service etc). Lastly the repositioning 
strategies in the growth phase which may,. among other things,. in1-'·ol ve 
diversification~ market penetration or divesting products. 
Porter { 1985 : 65 - 70) describes three generic strategies which 
\. 
can be used by any firm in any industry .to gain a competitive edge 
over rival organisations namely cost leadership,. differentiation and 
focus. The three generic strategies are depicted on Figure 2. 1 . The 
cost leaders manufacture products or pr>::Jc'l.dde .ser1-'·ices at costs 
consistent.131· below those of competitors. Differentiators provide 
services or create products that are difficult to imitate because of 
their quality,. image or novelty. Buyer loyalty is enhanced,. and 
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Figure 2.1 Three Generic Strategies (Source: Porter (198.5 66) 
The generic strategies sugg~sted by Hoffman were developed in 
mature manufacturing industries in the USA. These st.rat.egi·e.s may not 
be applicable for service industries such as air transport in third 
world countries. However~ the generic strategies suggested by Porter 
are more general and can be used by an organisation in any industry 
such as ser'l.>·ice or manufacturing. Therefore~ Porter#s generic 
strategies will be used in this study. 
Hof er { 1986 : 682 - 684) make a distinction between strategic and 
operating turnarounds. Strategic turnarounds hwol ve altering t.he 
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Production efficienc1r can be achie,,.~ed through efficient and 
effective airline scheduling. C.osts can be minimised through optimum 
utilisation of an airline~s resources if the sc-hedule permits. 
Airline scheduling which involves the design of market demand related 
system wide flight patterns should allow corporate objectives to be 
achieved. Efficient and effective scheduling involves striking a 
balance between crew utilisation~ equii;ment maintenance~ use of 
facilities~ market and other factors as described below. 
a. Airline Scheduling. 
Pilots~ flight engineers and cabin attendants should be 
adequately trained on the relevant aircraft type and optimally 
utilised to ensure minimal costs and ma:i:imum profit. The 
maintenance plans and schedules ought to be designed to enable 
an even flow of maintenance work to ensure the efficient.. 
utilisation ·~f facilities and personnel while ensuring that the 
required aircraft are available for .services. Adequate 
facilities to meet the anticipated demand such as gate space~ 
ticket counters,. waiting rooms~ cargo and baggage handling 
facilities should be available. 
b_ Ma.intenmu::e 
Aircraft should be ma:int.ained to ensure the highest. possible 
level of safety and safe aircraft sh-ould be provided for every 
schedule. ·The maintenance system should be designed to allow 
maximum aircraft utilization or minimal out - of- service time 
for aircraft while pro,..·iding high standards of maintenance. To 
minimise costs, the time allowable in the various maintenance 
programmes need to be. utilised to the ma..~inP..un. Since aircraft 
maintenance require various highl!f trained and skilled personnel 
who constitute a significant cost element in an airline, it is 
necessary to utilise them optimally. Hence the need for an even 
flow of work to avoid overloading the maintenance capacity at 
times. Likewise, it is also necessary to optima:lh~ utilize 
expensive maintenance facilities such as tools, workshops, test 
and other equipment. 
c. Fleet Planning 
Fleet planning invoh··es the selection of the optimum number~ type 
and size of aircraft to ensure that an airline~s objectives are 
effecti,..·ely realized. The information required in the fleet 
planning process include current resources, corporate objectives, 
the projected operating environment and the marketing strategy. 
This information is fed into computers to produce the fleet 
planning model to determine future aircraft requirements. This 
is followed b)· airer.aft evaluation and selection which takes into 
consideration design characteristics~ physical performance~ 
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Cost efficiency in fleet planning is realized through limiting 
the number of aircraft types in an airline~s fleet {Gialloreto 
1988 : 41-42). This reduces pilot and other flight crew training 
costs, maintenance and maintenance training costs, the cost of 
spare parts inventories and the O\l'erall complexity of the 
operation. Gialloreto illustrates this point by Pan Am~s steady 
decline following its acquisition of National in early 1980s. 
In acquiring National., Pan Am~s objective was to take ad,..·antage 
of National~s relatively strong domestic route structure, its 
lower costs and its relativel?r high qualitir of servic-e in se,..~eral 
markets to achie,le profitable o-perations. However, Pan Am~s 
financial performance deteriorated after its acquisition of 
National because., among other reasons., it found itself with three 
wide body fleet types of Boeing 74.7s, Lockheed L-1011s and 
Douglas DC-10.s. 
d. Labour Productivity. 
Table 2. 3 shows the average annual remuneration for pi lots, co-· 
pilots and cabin attendants for some airlines in America, Europe 
and Asia/Australasia. From the table it is evident that there 
is wide variation in remuneration for the same category of staff 
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According t.o Doganis (1992 : 134) .. the ultimate cost. of labour 
depends not onhl' on the le,..·el of remuneration but also on labour 
productivity. ·This depends on in.sti tutional and operational 
factors. J.nstitut.ional factors include working dait·s per week .. 
basic hours worked per week.. length of annual holidays .. maximum 
duty periods for fhdng staff .. among others. Operation.al factors 
include the size of air-craft.. stage length and frequencies of 
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a. Cost and Revemie 
Being a low cost leader does not necessarily guarantee success. 
An airline must be able to generate unit revenues which are 
greater than unit cost. For example Wardair,. one of the lowest 
'• 
cost airlines in the world (see Table 2 . .5) made a loss in the 
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c. Yield Management 
Airline yields are not just related to the fares charged but to 
several factors. The ideld per passenger on a given route 
depends on the traf"fic mix.,. that is.,. the number of passengers 
travelling on different fares (Doganis 1992 : 312). The traffic 
mix need to be effici·ently and effecti"·ely managed so as to 
maximise revenue through the technique of yield management. The 
technique of yield management involves managing the airline's 
seat capacity {balancing the number of discount and standard fare 
reservations).,. in order to achieve maximum revenue on a gi.,,.·en 
departure. This is achieved by satisfying as many of a given 
travel market segment as possible. 
In a "·ery competith··e market,. there could be temptation for a low 
cost airline to discount its fares in order to achieve high load 
factors.,. thereby beating the competition in terms of price. As 
pointed out above.,. the discounted fares ought to cover the low 
cost for success. There is-:- however.,. a danger that if too many 
seats are sold at lo"' fares.,. the yield or revenue per passenger 
will decline. Some standard or full fare paying passengers may 
be diverted to the low fares.,. thereby reducing revenue. It is.,. 
therefore.,. necessar)· to limit. revenue dilution by effective yield 
management through pricing mechanism and seat inventory 
management. To minimise revenue dilution through diversion of 
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Re.,,.~enue enhancement is critical and very beneficial to an airline 
since an increase in revenue is accompanied by only a marginal 
increase in expenses. Yield management is an important component 
of the cost leadership strategy. 
Co5t. efficiency 
Cost efficiency is achieved by having the lowest possible cost 
for a given level of output in terms of the technical output {seat or 
tonne kilometres) at a given level of customer service and the market 
output/income (passenger or tonne kilometres). It is nec-essarTJ to 
continuously seek for cost reduction without sacrificing aC'\...-eptable 
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Being a low cost airline will invite reaction or imitation by 
competitors who will take steps to erode the airlines· competitive 
advantage. It is,. therefore,.. necessary to continuously look at'areas 
to cut costs. Described below are ,,..arious areas which airlines need 
to look at to minimise costs. 
a. Fuel Costs 
Costs can be minimised by careful control on fuel costs. Fuel 
costs are often a significant proportion of total costs. One wait 
to minimise fuel costs is by using the more modern,. fuel 
efficient aircraft. This could be achieved by the replacement 
of some three or four engined ageing airer.a.ft such .as the Boeing 
707s,.. DC-Bs or DC-10s with modern twin engined aircraft such as 
the Boeing 76'7s where possible. Howe1,1·er,.. capital costs of new 
aircraft tend to be significantly higher requiring management to 
carefully plan the operations of their fleet so as to take 
advantage of the lower operating costs through greater aircraft 
utilisation. 
Fuel costs can also be contained by reducing or avoiding,.. 
wherever possible,.. the uplift of fuel from expensive airports. 
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b~ User Charges 
Management often have little or no control over some user charges 
such as airport charges,. en route navigation charges,. fue 1 prices 
and wage levels. However,. airline management ma1.t be able to 
persuade their governments or domestic .airport authorities to 
give them pref·erential treatment on :such charges as airport or 
en-route navigation charges. 
e. Aircraft Size.,. Speed and Range 
The t)·pes of airer.aft used and their characteristics affect. 
costs. With respect to aircraft size,. in :general,. the larger an 
aircraft ... the lower will be its direct o;;;orerating costs {DOC) per 
unit of output., that is~ per available tonne - kilometre (ATK) 
or seat - kilometre as shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 
AVERAGE SEATS PER AIRCRAF'f 
DOC Against Aircraft Size - US Airlines,. year to 30 
September 1989 (Doganis 1992 : 146). 
The reason for this is that larger aircraft can take larger and 
more efficient engines and have propor~ionately more payload and 
lower drag per unit of weight. Also the cost of aircraft 
maintenance does not increase proportionately with size. 
'Economies can also be realized in flight crew costs since 
generally the larger aircraft and the smaller aircraft would 
often have the same crew numbers,. although the flight crew who 
fly larger aircraft may be paid more. However,. larger aircraft 
like the Boeing 767 or DC-10s normally incur higher total round -
trip costs for same sectors than amaller aircraft of the same 
generation like the Boeing 737s. There are several reasons for 
this which include the following (Doganis 1992 : 144 - 147): 
( i) Crew members of the larger aircraft tend to be paid more 
than for a smaller aircraft. 
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(iii') The landing fees and en route na,,.·igation charges of an 
aircraft are related to its weight. 
Larger aircraft often have an added cost advantage in flying at 
a higher speed due to increased hourly productivity {product of 
payload and speed). Although lower aircraft speed result in 
lower fuel consumption.,. the larger aircraft flying faster would 
result in the cost ad\rantages of size and s:peed reinforcing each 
other with the resultant lower tonne-kilometre or seat-kilometre 
costs. 
Figure 2. 4 shows how aircraft size.,. speed and range determine an 
aircraft~s productivity cur\'·e and consequently its unit costs. 
The average speed is calculated on the basis of block time for 
the sector, block time being from engines on at start of journe~· 
to engines off on completion of journey. The average speed 
increases with increase in sector length. An aircraft. ma!J· spend 
most of its airborne time on climb or de&...-ent on short sectors, 
with sometimes only a few minutes at altitude resulting in lower 
average bl·ock speed. An increase in stage length would result 
in an increase in average block speed as a result of more time 
being spent at cruising speed while climb-:- descent and manoeuvre 
time on ground becomes a small proportion of block time. 
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The cost leadership strategy entails the provision of airline 
services at costs that are consistently below those of competitors 
which allows them to earn reasonable profits or return on investment 
at prices that 'lirould cripple their competitors. The strategy requires 
production efficiency~ market/service efficiency and cost efficienc~· 
to be realized. Production efficiency is achieved through the 
efficient utilisation of human resources and the costh' capital 
equipment in the airline inventory. Market/service efficiency is 
realized through an airline having adequate load factors or adequate 
yields through the effective employment of the technique of yield 
management. Cost efficiency is achieved by having costs that are 
lower than those of competitors. Being a low cost airline enables it 
to defend itself against Porter~s five competitive forces. 
2.4 
2.4.1 
Differentiation Strategy 
General 
A differentiation strategy entails the ability to offer customers 
something different from competitors. This involves providing many 
service variations~ wide selection of services on offer and a strong 
emphasis on the chosen differentiating features. The marketing 
emphasis is on building in whatever ser1dce features buyers are 
willing to pay for (Porter 1985:67-68). Since differentiating 
involves extra costs, a premium tar-iff is char-ged to cover the e~:tra 
costs. 
44 
Susta.in.i.ng t.hl:= St.ra:tegy 
the TriJ:J:rket, 
2.4.3 Scope £or Dif £erentiating Services 
Traditionally.,. under the International Air Transport Association 
conditions of service.. the airline service was fairly homogenous 
{Doganis 1985:20). For example.,. there were regulations governing the 
seat pitch.,. the quality of drinks served in the aircraft and in-flight 
catering. 
2.4.4 Employment 0£ the Dif f'erentiation strategy by Asian 
Airlines 
Doganis {198.5:39") explains how some Asian airlines have managed 
to achieve excellent performance through differentiating their 
services by offering a high quality of customer seri.rice. Airlines 
such as Thai International.,. Singapore International Airlines (SIA) and 
Korean Airlines {KAL).,. who were non-IATA carriers in the 1970s.,. 
captured market share on regional and long haul markets. This was 
achieved bi.-· offering much higher levels of in-flight service than was 
45 
through. their 
is A it 
deems fit 
In 1983, SIA ~.aere said to 
h.a.ve r.;pe·c-ated their Boeing 747s lr:rith eigh.tee·cl r.;a.birl st .. a.ff when t ... h.e 
Aiz· lines h.a.d fifteerl, 
The 
pel:· cent,, ~.:nrl t'fF.;.l~:ysia Air lities wit .. h 15 }::.er r.;erit, 
I 
., 
1.• ,.... u t... F.:-t:'r!'.di of both 
J!.t~ 
'"!:• ... 
Doganis {1992 : 8-9) shows how the rapid growth of Asian airlines 
completely changed the structure of the international airlines 
industry. ln 1973.,. about 75 per cent of int·ernational air traffic was 
generated by European and North American airline.s. Howe1,..er.,. by 1988.,. 
this dominant position had been signifi~antly reduced to where their 
joint share was just over 55 :per cent. Asian and Pacific carriers 
more than doubled their share from 14 per cent to 29 per cent of the 
world-s international traffic during the same 15 year period. 
Asian carriers such as SIA and KAL managed to capture significant 
market share by not being members of IATA. As non-IATA members.,. they 
could differentiate their ser'¥·ices by offering a much higher quality 
of in-flight sen.·ices than was allowed under IATA~s "conditions of 
service". lATA members had to comply with strict regulations 
relating to.,. among other things.,. meals.,. bar-service.,. free gifts and 
entertainment resulting in more or less uniform sen-·ice. Non IATA 
airlines.,. on the other hand.,. could differentiate their services by 
offering a big.ls a quality of in-flight services including a wide 
variety of meals.,. drinks~ free gifts and entertainment. 
An airline can differentiate itself from others by being usuall~· 
the first to introduce new aircraft types or by operating 'i"er~· modern 
aircraft. Most airlines depreciate their new aircraft over a period 
of about 16 years to a zero residual value. For SIA.,. the estimated 
life of their aircraft is .5-6 years although this has sometimes been 
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Dealing with Competitive Force~ 
A successful differentiation strategy creates lines of defence 
against Porter~s five competitive forces as discussed below (Dobson 
& Starke1" 1993 : 60'). It creates a barrier to new entrants due to 
customer loyalty and uniqueness. It shields the airline from intense 
price competition within the industry sin-ce customers would be willing 
to pay a premium for a superior quality of service. The threat. from 
substitutes is minimised as a result of loyalty of customers. The 
bargaining power of buyers is also minimised since there are no 
service alternati"·es which would be attractive to the customers. The 
airline would be in a strong position to bargain with suppliers 
because of its premium prices/fares and its eminent position in the 
market. The airline should be in a position to achieve superior 
profitability as a result of its ability to defend itself against 
competitive forces. 
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4.9 
A differentiation strategy involve the provision of airline l 
services that are different from those of competitors and are 
difficult to imitate because of their quality,. innovativeness or 
image. The strategy would be targeted on a broad cross-section of the 
market. With the advent of deregulation,. there is now plent)· of scope 
for airlines to differentiate their services. Some non-IATA airlines 
such as SIA, KAL and C-athay Pacific ,gained considerable market sh.are 
in international services as well as profitability by offering a high 
quality of service above that stipulated under IATA-s conditions of 
service,. demonstrating the viabilit?i' of the differentiating strategy. 
2.5 
2.5.1 
Focus Strategy 
General 
In a focus or specialisation stratemr,. the strategic target is 
a narrow market niche where the customer needs and preferences are 
distincti"·ely different from the rest of the market (Porter 1985 : 68-
69). The airline adopting this strategy would gain a competiti"·e edge 
by concentrating on a particular group of c·ustomers or limited 
geographical market. The airline may have lower costs than 
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a. w"'here airline·s resources do not allow it to operate across 
a wider market. 
b. wnen the market segments are distinctly different and 
differ markedly in terms of size, profitability, intensity 
of competi ti ,le forces and growth rates. 
c. .When no other rival airlines are attempting to focus on the 
same market segment. 
A successful focus strategy, due to a focused airline·s ability 
to offer unequalled skills and competence in serving the niche, help 
it to defend against Porter·s fh··e competitive forces (I.'iobson & 
Starkey 1993 : 62}. The foc-user·s distincti.,.. .. e competence acts as a 
barrier to entry into the market by rivals as well as substitutes. 
Possible competitors cannot match the focused airline·s ability to 
serve its customers. Customers are likely to be unwilling to buy 
services from airlines which are unable to serve their specialised 
needs thereby reducing their bargaining power. 
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2.5.3 Risks o"f Focus Strategy 
1:J. fr.;c1J.6 st r~.teg~1 {iii l ler- 1992 : 37 - 38) .. It ~.-y be possible fo-t:· 
viable Uli'J.rket. 
A focus strategy can be used to gain a competitive edge o,,.·er 
rivals. There are two variants of the focus strateg)· namely the cost 
focus and differentiation focus. In a cost focus, an airline would 
seek to maintain costs consistently below those of its competitors in 
its target segment. In a differentiation focus, an airline would seek 
to provide services that are difficult to imitate because of quality, 
novelty or image in its target market. A focused airline .. s 
distinctive competence and skills help it to defend against Porter .. s 
five competitive forces. 
The literature on the contribution of management to the decline 
and recovery or turnaround of organisations is extensi v•e. The 
insights on su-....-cessful turnarounds elsewhere would assist in coming 
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f",;f 
. . 
1".J11il..8Sl..f" ..fli. 
timely 
line well ~:ca:rl 7.1.djl.l.St.. 
the 
Errors of commission wer-e actions taken b!~ management which 
contributed to a business decline such .as over-expansion of products .. 
personnel and facilities beyond the firm~s resources. 
A study of company turnaround.s in New Zealand by Addison & 
Hamilton (1988 95") also re\.·eal that corporate decline and reco,,.·ery 
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Camimm.i.ca.t. 'ion 
Clausen (1990 : H.>0'),. Heyer .& Van Lee {1991 : 40 - 45),. Finkin 
(1992 57 - 58') and Hoffman ( 1989 61 ') discuss the need for 
efficient and effective communication systems for successful 
turnaround. The communication need to be credible-:- continuous-:-
consistent and confident both inside and outside the organisation. 
Inside the organisation-:- the board of directors need to be convinced 
about the success of the new turnaround strategies. Effecti\re 
communication with employees or their representatives is also 
necessary so that they are informed of the changes required in the 
organisation and their necessity-:- how the company will be turned 
around and to make employees part of the winning team effecting 
necessary chan~s for the benefit of all. Employee fears about 
possible job losses need to be frankly and openly addressed. 
The outside organisations which need to be effectively 
communicated with include lenders,. major customers-:- suppliers and the 
Government,. among others. Lenders need to be convinced that their 
financial investments are safe. Customers and suppliers need to be 
convinced to continue doing business with the organisation during its 
turnaround. The Go'··ermnent. is an important constituency if it is a 
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The 
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within the ~.i'l'li·.ne~ 
persormel who e~tr.;el in cr~tb:tg u:p with id.e~.s tr.; c-:it costs il;J.11 help i·n 
bi3.sis f'.Jf There 
The management of a focused airline need to carefull?-' consider 
the needs of their target segment and determine whether to employ low 
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An airline~s personnel are its most import.ant resource. Hence., 
there is need for SADC airlines to make commitments to human resource 
development. A safe., reliable., efficient and excellent sen-·ice can 
only be cultivated and developed by a dedicated., skilled and diligent 
workforce. There is need to invest heavily in staff training and 
development. SADC airlines need to do this so as to ensure that a 
chosen turnaround strategy is properly implemented. 
2.7 The Mc-Kinsey 7-S Framework 
When an appropriate turnaround strategy i.s identified some 
productive changes within Sit.DC airlines would be necessary to ensure 
that the chosen strategy is effectively implemented. The literature 
research revealed one conceptual model namely the Mc-Kinsey 7-S 
framework {Jauch and Glueck 1988 : 303 - 305)., which could be employed 
to ensure effective organisational change. 
According to Waterman., Peters and Phillips (1988 : 271 - 273),. 
the 7-S framework {described below) is attracthre since it allows 
consideration of .several interconnected factors., not just one or two. 
They state that any notions of organisation change that ignore its 
many aspects or their interconnectedness are dangerous. Waterman., et. 
al ( 1988 : 2'72') quoted an article in Fortune magazine which commented 
that as many as 90 percent of carefully planned strat·egies do not 
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tr.; r:J.11 tt'a.e el.em.-erra.ts of tl"1e 7-!3 m.r.Jrlel .. 
The McKinsey 7-S framework is employed to analyse the internal 
environment of Air Zimbabwe in particular and SADC airlines in 
general. 
airlines. 
This is to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the 
It would be necessary to capitalise on the strengths and 
minimise the impact of the weaknesses or to overcome some of the 
weaknesses. This would ensure that the organisations~ strategies are 
both practical and feasible. 
The McKinsey 7-S framework (Figure 2. 5) shows that organisation# s 
effectiveness stems from the interaction of several factors namely 
strategy,. structure.. systems ., 
{superordinate goals) and skills. 
style,. staff,. shared values 
All these factors influence an 
organisation#s ability to change and how best it can effect change. 
All the variables are interconnected and managers cannot afford to 
ignore any of the factors. If any of the factors is ignored., it can 
result in the failure of some well planned strategies. None of the 
variables in the diagram can,. therefore., be said to be more important 
or more critical than the others and to change an organisation at an!f· 
one particular time., any of the variables could be the driving force 
or the critical variable. 
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inr.; h~d.es the Jll(".J l i. ti.cal"" l'!l.:nd. 
b. Structure. Yne structure of an organisat-ion is the organisation 
chart which shows how task.s .are divided up and integrated and 
shows who reports to whom .. The emphasis here is on coordination 
and the ability to focus on.those dimensions which are currently 
important to the evolution of the organisation. 
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SADC airlines need to improve or incr-ease productivity of their 
employees. They can take advantage of their relatively low wage 
levels to gain a ~~petitive edge over their rivals. 
SADC airlines also need to achieve market/service efficiency for 
cost effective operations. In this case where the markets served by 
SADC airlines .are not large enough to achieve adequate load factors~ 
it would be necessary t.o reduce the frequenc!t of services or the 
capacity available by':' for instance, selling or leasing some aircraft. 
The market size could be increased through effective marketing of SADC 
airlines~ services. 
S5 
yield 
Cost efficiency is alsr., "'~e;r.'? C"l"itir..:i"J.l -fm:· the 
leadership str;;;.tegy. ht r.;.11 ;;;.rei"J.8 
of F.$.irline Si"J.C"l"i f ic i-r1g <;.P~.lity 
sever;;;.l o!1:r·eas whir..:h S~.DC T:J.b:·lb:1es c;;;.r1 minimise costs. 
e.ircrF.:J.ft 757s 
Mc Dorrne 1 Drfl~g l7:J.8 M0-1 ls. 
r.;-c.· the "l).J!-lift fuel 
their to give 
chF.$.."I·ges. 
es 
it 
costs 
2.8.2 
ef f ic ir.fc;.cy rea.lizerl if 7-1.ir lines 
tr.; hi r.s. 
r.;f sel:.,.,ices 
The hight::(~ effir..:iertcy r.;f the 
C<.JStfi ......... 
'""'·""' 
Di'f 'ferent i.at. i.an Strategy 
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Some Asian airlines ha,,.·e in the last quarter of a cent.ury gained 
significant market share and profitability through effectively 
differentiating their services throug..~ providing a high quality of 
customer services which was much better than that offered by their 
competitors. SAIK~ airlirtes could also differentiate their services 
by~ for instance~ taking advantage of low wage costs to provide a 
higher quality of in-flight and on-ground services for their 
customers. 
However~ to provide a differentiated service requires that SADC 
airlines carry out extensive marketing research to find out the needs 
of their customers in the various markets they serve. This would 
require sophisticated marketing re.search which ma!.'· be beyond the 
capabilities of SADC airlines because of their limited financial and 
technical resources and expertise compared with their major European 
and other competitors. 
An airline adopting the differentiating strategy would also need 
to market their services in their various markets they operate or wish 
to service. This would also require sophisticated and expensive 
international marketing techniques which are also largely beyond the 
resources of SADC airlines. 
Asian airlines., such as SIA and Cathay 'Pacific~ also 
differentiated them.selves by being innovative and operating a very 
Focus Strategy 
A focus or specialisation strategy would involve SAL'C airlines 
concentrating their operations on a particular group of customers or 
limited geographical market. For e:i:ample.,. SAI.'C airlines could focus 
on the business or executive type of customers or the tourist segment. 
Alternativehr.,. SAIK! airlines could concentr-ate their operations within 
the SADC region or sub-Saharan Africa or just domestic operations. 
Another option is to focus their operations on inter-continent.al 
services. 
2.8.4 Policy Changes 
It is necessary for SADC Governments to effect polic?->· changes to 
facilitate the turnaround of SADC airlines. It would be necessary for 
SADC Gover!'l..ments to give more commercial freedom to the airlines. 
This could in,,.·oh··e governments relinquishin·g ownership of airlines. 
Management of the airlines would be able to formulate the appropriate 
mission of the airline. The airline~s mission would gh··e the overall 
or unique aim of the airline. This should be followed by the 
objective of the airline which would include the desired end results 
with specific profit~ return on investment or market share required 
to be achieved by the airline. 
r.;.chievi·cag t .. he 
2.9 Choice o-f Strategy 
Th is ~.,:rr.Ju. id 
appear to be fe~Bibie ideal st ..rategies ~or SADC airlines. 
A COEtt ler.;.dership st rr.;.t .. egy reqrJ.ires t..he:t a:ca. r.;.il:· l i·ne pr<.P"1ides 
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It 
3 _ 0 Com:; hurl.ans 
In this chapter.. the possible strategies to turnaround SADC~ 
airlines were discussed. These are cost leadership,. differentiation 
and focus strategies. The cost leadership strategy seeks to gain a 
sustainable cost advantage o\rer competitors. "!"he differentiation 
strategy seeks to offer customers something different from competitors 
and then charging a premimn tariff to cover the extra costs and obtain 
adequate yields. The focus strategy rests on the choice of a narrow 
competitive scope within the airline industry. Management is critical 
in the formulation and implementation of appropriate turnaround 
strategies. 
It appears that the broad based cost leadership strategy or the 
cost focus strategy may be the ideal strategies to turnaround SAI'tC 
airlines. However':' this hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 4. 
The Mc-Kinsey 7-S framework was also discussed. The model 
explains that for a turnaround strategy to be effectively implemented 
would stem from the effecthre interact.ion of the elements of strategy .. 
structure~ systems':' style,. staff,. shared values and skills. The model 
will be used in chapter 5 to analyse t.he internal environment. of SAI'C 
airlines to reveal weaknesses and strengths. 
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3 CASE STUDIES OF TWO SUCCESSFUL-
TURNAROUNDS AND A CONSISTENTLY 
PROFITABLE AIRLINE 
3_1 Introduction 
In this chapter some airlines which ha\.-e carried out successful 
turnarounds., or which have consistently maintained profitable 
operations are discussed. The objective of studying these airlines 
is to enable us., based on the ideal strategies for success discussed 
in chapter 2., to derive practical strategies which were or are being 
successfully employed. This would assist in coming up with pragmatic 
turnaround strategies for SADC airlines in the next chapter. 
The literature research revealed two successful and remarkable 
turnarounds by British Airways {BA) and Scandinavian Airline System 
(SAS) at about the same time .. 1981 - 1983 as well as a consistently 
profitable airline., Singapore International Airlines {SlA). Since 
third ~--orld countries e}~perience broadly similar problems which 
include underdevelopment.. limited foreign exchange.. scarcity of 
skilled labour., among other problems,. a successful airline turnaround 
or a consistently profitable airline for over twenty years could have 
yielded important lessons which could be adapted for SAIC airlines. 
However., attempts to find suc-cessful turnarounds from Africa or any 
other third world countries proved fruitless. 
There are some important differences between SAI'C airlines and 
the two European .airlines namely BA and SAS. These two airlines are 
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3.2 
3.2.1 
A remarkable turnaround of British Airways {BA') took pl.ace in the 
early 1980s (1981 - 1983). Prior to this period .. BA was Go\l·ernment 
owned. The Airline operated in a protectionist environment without 
free and open competition. 
bilateral inter-go\l·ernmental 
The air routes were 
agreement. Fares 
governments. The airline was making losses. 
operated through 
were agreed by 
The operating environment for airlines in general was worsening 
from the mid 1970s following the oil crisis in 1973/74 which resulted 
in the price of oil rising steeply. w'"hen the Conservative Party led 
by Mrs Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 ~ they planned to 
privatise BA. The Conseri.,ati'lle Party felt that public enterprises 
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BJ. th'l'ives 
. 
l.S "Tr..s be the bee.-+.. 
74: 
g. To be a good neighbour,. concerned for the community and the 
environment. 
3.2.3 Mega Carrier 
BA acquired British Caledonian for 250 million pounds sterling 
in December 1987 and the merger was completed by 1988 (Marshall 1992 
31). The acquisition of British Caledonian was aimed at ensuring 
that BA was a stronger major international airline for Britain. This 
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U8A, Europe ,i;,:ra.d. e lsewh.ere . 
British C~ledonian had several attractive features which 
complemented BA. The Airline had an extensive domestic and 
international route network which included markets not served by BA 
in Africa and the Middle East {l'!oganis 1992 : 99). British Caledonian 
was the largest operator from Gatwick Airport in London where it. had 
about a quarter of the runway slots. This effectively allowed BA to 
consolidate its dominance of the UK domestic market. 
3.2.4 Global Alliances 
In 1978 there was deregulation of the domestic airline industry 
in the USA (I~ganis 1992 : 52). Numerous airlines were formed but 
they collapsed after a short period of existence. By 1989~ the six 
largest USA airlines were responsible for 84 per cent of the domestic 
passenger - kilometres generated ('Doganis 1992 : 95). This e'~:perience 
showed BA and other airlines the importance of size for success due 
to economies of scale and marketing benefits of sco:pe. An airline had 
to actively participate in most markets to be succ-essful. 
BA appreciated the importance of size as discussed in section 
3.2.3 above. Hence the merger with British C~ledonian. BA also 
bought 40 per cent stake in Br!,.i"'m'On Airwa!;s~ a UK regional airline~ in 
1987 (Dog.anis 1992 : 97 - 99). Ha\··ing consolidated their dominance 
in t.he UK~ BA embarked on a .strategy of setting up worldwide marketing 
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Up t.o the early 1980s., British Airwa)·s like other European 
operators had operated under highly regulated .and controlled markets 
(Doganis 1992 : 95). By mid 1980s., European markets began the process 
of relaxing regulations. With the removal of regulations there arose 
more opportunities for product differentiation. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2 .. BA is committed to a high quality 
of customer service as well as commitment to attracting and retaining 
the best staff to ensure the implementation of its goals. Bl' 
implementing this commitment., the Airline has managed to successfully 
out.compete its rivals in various markets., allowing BA to achieve an 
upturn from the loss making situation in the early 1980s to achieve 
its goal of strong and consistent profitabilit.!r since then to the 
present. 
3.2.6 Financial Performance 
When the British Government announced its intention to privatise 
BA .. the airline industry was in a recession (Marshall 1992 : 28 - 29). 
Industry estimates for 1980 showed that the overall airline losses 
would be US$2.6 billion. The industry~s cumulative losses since 1979 
then totalled US$6.2 billion. Air-lines like I'.ielta, Eastern, Pan Am, 
American, Japan Airlines., British Airways and British Caledonian ~-ere 
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costs. 
By 1982 BA was technically bankrupt with losses of 544 .8 million 
pounds sterling. Part of the loss was due to se\>·erance packages 
resulting from massive reduction of personnel as discussed above. 
In the five years 
privatised, the Airline 
ended 31 March 1987 
earned 1100 million 
when BA was fully 
pounds sterling in 
operating surpluses and more than 800 million pounds in pre-tax 
profits. Borrowings were reduced from 1000 million pounds sterling 
to less than 300 million pounds sterling (Marshall 1992:29). BA has 
consistently maintained profitability since then. For example, in the 
1991-92 and 1992-93 financial years, the profit after ta.~ was 395 and 
178 million pounds sterling respectively. This 'h-as at a time when the 
vast majority of airlines .all over the world were making losses 
(British Airways plc Report. and Accounts 1992-93:1). 
3. 2 .. 7 Summary 
Various reasons were attributed to the successful turnaround by 
BA. In Lord Ring, there was a leader who had the capabilities~ the 
vision, the personalit:?,r and the leadership style to be .able to take 
bold steps to make a remarkable turnaround under unf.avour.able 
operating environment. Some painful sacrifices in terms of job losses 
had to be made and this was achieved without. major industrial 
relations disruptions. 
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BA took advantage of its strengths of a dedicated workforce, an 
extensive route network; the status of London as the world- s most 
important air transport hub; committed, motivated and competent top 
management and the soundness of its balance sheet while oi. .. ercoming 
some of its major weakness as a high cost airline. It overcame some 
of the threats from "mega-carriers" from the USA, Europe and elsewhere 
by merging with British Caledonian while taking advantage of 
opportunities created in the increasingly deregulated operating 
environment. 
By being a large airline, BA took the opportunity to try and 
differentiate its services from competitors. The Airline carries out 
extensive advertising in all its markets using a variety of channels 
such as television~ magazines, radio and posters. The Airline uses 
this to promote its corporate image of an effici·ent Airline with a 
high qualit)· of customer service. Certainl11·, by emploi,.-ing an 
extensiv·e and efficient computer reservation s?,rstem, automatic 
ticketing systems, modern aircraft fleet, efficient and helpful 
airline staff, excellent in-flight entertainment, good food and 
variety of drinks and other service features~ the Airline is highly 
rated all over the world as evidenced b?,r its excellent performance. 
Fr ..n:· e~:mple, the t..mrciErt 
Tttr.s.rk.et is sr.msitbre tr.; the ecr.J·c~omir.: sit"lJ.r.J.t,,ion in F.$. cr.;u:at-r-y, l:·egion O"l: 
the wm:·ld. 
3.3 Scan.di.na:vi.a:n Air line Syst·em {SAS) 
3.3.1 
SAS is a regional airline owned 28.57 per cent. by I:ten.i.nark,. 28.57 
per cent by Norway and 42.86 per cent by Sweden. In each of the 
countries namely Denmark.,. Norway and Sweden,. SAS .. s sh.ares are owned 
by the respective State and private shareholders who each rn-m 50 per 
cent of the Airline .. s shares (SAS Annual Report 1992 · 21). In the 
early 1980s {1980 - 1983") the Airline was incurring losses. The 
Airline experienced a remarkable turnaround spearhe.aded by its 
Managing Director.,. Jan Carlzon. In this section is e:~.amined the 
p-.erformance and strategies pur.sued or implemented by the Airline from 
the period of its turnaround to the recent past (about 1993). 
3.3.2 Corporate Philosophy 
1, 9). 
While successfully carrying out its remarkable turnaround in the 
early 1980s-:- SAS was aware of the changing operating environment 
brought about. by deregul.ation. Following deregulation in the USA 
domestic .services in the lat·e 1970s-:- as mentioned before .. several 
airlines sprang up but were liquidated within some few years leaving 
the United States market dominated by some few mega carriers. SAS had 
predicted that with deregulation spreading to Europe.. by mid 1990s·.,. 
the European airline industry would also be dominate by some few meg.a 
carriers providing services on several markets (SAS Annual Report 1992 
4,. 8). 
SAS heeded lessons from developments in the USA in the 1980s 
which showed that an airline needed a strong domestic market to ensure 
long term sur,,.·ival (SAS Annual Report 1992 : 8 - 9}. For example.,.. Pan 
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To differentiate its ser.,dces,. SAS had to firstly undertake 
market r-esearch to find out what the needs of the business market 
wer-e. They found that,. among other things,. instead of costly new 
aircraft,. all SAS needed was to repaint their existing aircraft in 
more aesthetically appealing colours,. redecorat·e and making aircraft 
interiors clean or spotless as well as providing a convenient,. 
reliable,. safe and punctual service. The Airline intensified customer 
service training {Peters and Austin 1985:78). 
Doganis {1992 : 261) also discusses some surveys done by SAS in 
the early 1980s to find out what its passengers perc-eh··ed as the most 
important for them in choosing a flight when making their 
reservations. More than two thirds of those surve!-'·ed stated that 
departure/arri-,,.·al times \llo"ere very important and also two thirds stated 
that non-stop direct flights were also very important. Other factors 
were found to be unimportant in influencing a passenger~s choice. A 
mere three per cent stated that airer-aft type was an important 
consideration in their decision. As a result 
discontinued using the.ir new A300 Airbuses 
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prr..1fitability, 
SAS Annual Report (1992 : 11 - 12) reveal that the core of the 
Airline~s traffic is the dense feeder net"""Ork within Scandinavia 
centred around a high frequency service in the triangle between the 
three capitals namely Copenhagen,. Oslo and Stockholm., while Copenhagen 
is the main international hub. 
It also revealed that from 1992,. SAS started using the Amadeus 
worldwide distribution system allowing the Airline to reach a market 
of 200 million potential customers. Pre1,..iousbr,. the Airline was 
reported to have had access to only 20 million potential customers., 
largely in Scandinavia., via travel agents and its own system. 
To confirm the high quality of service offered by SAS in the 
business market segment,. the Airline was voted Denmark best service 
business in 1992 (SAS Annual Report 1992 : 12 - 13). SAS also claims 
to have had the best on time record of all European airlines in t.he 
previous ten years. Safety,. punctuality and sert.>~ice were said to be 
the main reason for the Airline~s success. 
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Ground Servi.ce.s 
The high quality of ser"'""ice offered by SAS in the air is 
complemented by high quality of service on the ground. Surveys 
suggested that business travellers are more concerned about speed 
through the terminal rather than comfort. Hence., to speed up the 
check-in-process especially when baggage is involved., SAS has been 
experimenting with automated check-in., ticket and boarding pass 
(Doganis 1992 : 270}. 
3.3.6 Financial Performance 
Following its remarkable turnaround in the early 1980s., SAS has 
generally maintained satisfactory financial performance. For e11~ample., 
the Airline made a profit of US$161 million in 1986 on an operating 
revenue of over US$2 billion (Southern African Economist 1988 : 13). 
SAS Annual Report { 1992 : 9) also explains the Airline·s strong 
financial position. For example., unlike most European airlines 
(except British Airways") .. SAS reported positive operating income 
between 1990 - 1992. 
Although SAS tends to be a high cost airline due to the need to 
incorporate several high qualit~., ser,,.·ice features as described before~ 
it howe\i'er gener.ates sufficient revenue to ensure profitability. 
Table 2. 5 shows that al though SAS was one of the highest cost 
airlines~ it made an operating profit of US.$233 million in 1988. 
Table 3.1 sho\IFS passenger yields of European airlines on international 
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Sez .... .=rices wi thi·ca. 21.rt-r.>pe, 1989 { Dog~.nis 1992 ::: 312}, 
3.3.7 
SAS~s remarkable turnaround was spearheaded by Jan Carlzon,. 
the Managing Director who had the vision,. courage and the 
leadership qualities required to lead the Airline from a loss 
making position into profitability or sound financial performance. 
Over a decade after the remarkable turnaround,. Jan C'..arlzon was 
still the Managing Director of the Airline,. successfully meeting 
the new challenges brought about by deregulation and the resultant 
intense competition. The Managing Director~ by ensuring that 
employees appreciated and understood the critical importance of 
excellent customer service~ all the employees then enthusiastically 
provided this service to t.he customer resulting in profitable 
Airline performance. Employees regularly came up with innovative 
ways t.o enhance customer service. 
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3~4 Singapore Interc-..ati.cmal Ai.rli.nes {SIA) 
SIA grew from a small regional carrier to one of the top five 
international carriers in the world in terms of revenue passenger 
kilometres~ according to the Airline~s managing director (SIA - A 
Profile 1992 : 1). SIA - A Profile details how SIA began operations 
in 1947 as Malayan Airways, 5er\ficing only neighbouring countries. 
During the two decades up to 1967~ the Airline grew steadily and 
changed its name twice~ firstly Malaysian Airways and then in 
1967 became known as Malaysia - Singa-pore Airlines (MSA). In 
1972, MSA was dissolved and two airlines namely Malaysian Airline 
System {now called Malaysian Airlines) and Singapore International 
Airlines emerged. 
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( 1992:: 7)_ 
The Airline~s cor:porate goals are: 
a. To deliver the highest quality of customer service that is 
safe,. reliable and economical. 
b. To generate earnings that provide sufficient resources for re-
investment and satisfactory returns to shareholders. 
c. To adopt human resource management practices company - wide 
that attract,. develop,. motivate and retain employees who 
contribute to the company~s objectives. 
d. To maximise the utilisation and productivity of all resources. 
38 
a.t tta.e sa.fet .. y 
fts.cilities r.s.11,, q..ia.l if ied., 
3.4.3 High Growth Airline 
1972. 9,, lfJ: J sh:r.J'.as t ... hr.s.t ... wh.e""t:·ea.s the 
grr.J'.-rt.h ra.te r.;f schedu.led. inte'l""nr.s.t ir.;·rin.l o.ir 1 ines 
per r.s.nrrr.:x:ra in the ·pe-r-ir,;d 1972 tr.; 1982,, 
ove-r: 4.5 per cent,, the b.ighe5't in the 
highly r!'.Ot..iv;.i.ted. ;.i:nd pror.hl.c+ .. ive st .. r.s.ff,, 
effective eqo ..i;em.ent 
ui.r.s.1'.·ket. 
trr.1.ined 
l."I .,, u 
il'L tfte 
tc be l:·e~l.lr.1.ted. by the IATA. 
{ Bl:·its & !3xo.lts 1992 :: 31) .. 
SIA,. together with some Asian Airlines such as Korean Airlines,. 
did not join IATA {Doganis 1985 37}. This allowed these Airlines 
to capture market share by offering much higher le1,..·els of in:flight. 
service than permitted under IATA#s conditions of ser1lice or less 
frequently,. through greater flexibility in their tariffs. The higher 
quality of cabin sen-·ice standards offered by SIA were described 
in .section 2. 4. 4. 
SIA - A Profile ( 1992 : 12 - 13} state that putting the customer 
first remains the cornerstone of the Airline#s operating philosoph:z,r. 
This philosophy was said to entail introducing inno'\~ative features and 
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1970s, 
One aspect of customer servh=-e is the fleet. SIA has a pol icy 
of offering passengers state-of-the art technology by offering the 
most modern fleet in the· world among the major carriers:- with an 
average aircraft age of just over 5 years. 
3.4.5 Ground Services 
According to SIA - A Profile (1992 :14):- the high quality of 
customer sendce in the air is paralleled by excellent ser'l.dce on the 
ground - at the airports and ticket offices. For this reason,. SIA 
launched in 1987 the "Outstanding Ser,..·ice on the Ground" scheme to 
improv·e the customer handling skills of the Airline#s 3 500 front line 
staff all over the world. 
At Singapore (."hangi Airport,. a new departure control system,. I\CS 
90,. was launched in August 1992. The s~·stem was designed to increase 
the speed and efficiency of check in operations and simplif?,' the 
training of check-in agents {SIA Annual Report 1992 - 93 : 18). 
3.4.6 Distributing and Promoting the Airline Product 
SIA~s Annual Report gives an account of how the Airline reaches 
it...s customers. Like most Airlines., SIA#s main channel of distribution 
is through t.ra\fel agents. John.son ( 1990 : 257 - 262) reveals that 75 
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SIA ""l"ecr.sgra.iser1 the 
of Abac1.1s 
ldr 1 ines, lwJ.7.$:ysir.s. Air l i·nes,. All 
The 
(1990 281 J r.i:t:·gued 
lr.Jyo.l ty., 
to t..r..li ld. 
1992 - 9:3 
t 
displr.s:y 
r.;ffer 
ttte !3wisse.ii:·'s .. -Qob.lifl.yer"' 
so.ir.1 + ,., . .,._, be 
of ~- the 
ChhV:L 
e.Ta.rl tr.s.ke 
were mr.;-c.·e 
e:nd. Rr.J.ffles 
neer.ls"' 8IA is ·!"ecognising the 
1992 - 93 : 23}~ 
Cargo 
SIA Annual Report. ( 1992 - 93 24 25} gives an aC\...-ount of 
SIA~ s Cargo operations. Because of the growing importance of air 
cargo worldwide~ important lessons can be derived by a closer look 
at how SIA manages its cargo operations. 
In recognition of the increasing importance of air cargo 
business~ SIA Cargo was set up as a separate dhlision of SIA in Jul1f 
1992. The Airline has a cargo fleet of Boeing 747 freighters seM.o·ing 
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Pr.i.cific 
SIA - A Profile ( 1992 17) out.line alliances which S'!A has 
forged with other airlines for mutual benefits. In 1989,. SIA formed 
an alliance with Delta Airlines and Swissair. These three airlines 
have a reputation for premium service,. sustained profit.ability,. 
strong balance sheets and a commitment to sound employee relations. 
Passengers can walk into any of the three airlines' ticket offic-e·s and 
receive seri..·ices such as reconfirmation or re-validating of tickets. 
The partners also share airport. lounges,. joint. tr.ade promotions and 
advertising,. reciprocal reservations and ticketing services,. inter-
changeable tour packages,. cargo automation programmes and global 
express services for small parcels. This cooperation effectively 
extends the Alliance partners' office network to over 380 cities in 
90 countries. 
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SIA, 
Re:publir...: 
1992 93 
lF.1 .. r-gely 
betweF.fn 8IP. ~:n.d the variou.s airlines. 
Air line Persarme 1 
( 1992 31. 35) C".JlJ.t l i·nes srA·s 
re l ir.J .. b le , e-f-fir.:iernt r.i.rtd exr.;e llent sF.ft'V'ir.:e was r..-·o.ltivated ..
Despite the 
of r.i .. re sim"1l. l~.terJ. rlelrJ.}:f sce-rVJ.rir.Js 
opportunities ... both 
staff r.i:nrl f lig.ht r.;"[-e"~ sr...: tb.;=, .. t hi.gh. ql.).r.J .. lit ..y 
with t .. he Air-li-r~e, r-igh.t .. ttu:-r...:1.i2.h 
3_4_10 Finaxteial Position 
Airline wrJl.ild. neither be S?rt;sidi.zed.. 
be f.JF.fCtef it .. 
9 ;:; . .,,. 
W.t1r.rt1 SIA w;:;.s ec.-+ .. ;:i.blisb.ed 1972/73 it mad.e il:J. 
pz·cfit after tax. cf s:i12~5 mill.ir.>·c1 (8IA - A P"!·o"file 1992 9 '!. 
.I ' t'rr.;fit 
1992/93 fi·rta=rtcio.l ye~.r "&O..S !3:$-9··45 miilir..rtl (~3Ili Arcro:s.a.l Repr-.Jl:·t 1992. - 93 
53}, 
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funding its 
investment r.J:c1d. ret~.b:ied. 
b~.lr.J:n:ces rlecre;;s.sed "fl:·r.1m s:i1 B41 millir.J·c1 t ... r.; S$305 tnillir .. rn r..h.le to 
pr-r.;f i l.e, a.ssets 
Of 
;::.i:ce still 
its risk. 
i'J.t S$2 511 m.illior1 exceed the 
highest 
1. ... ,.,. u 
ste.ff 
Table 3~2 s~ ~il"sm:Ll Ai.rimes 
&l;mce Sheet a.s a:t 31 March 1992 ,;md, 1993 
Capital Iu.rested: 
-ShJJ.rehr.; ld.era hrrest..mf.fctts 
and retained profits 
Total Liabilities: 
-Deferred liabilities 
-Long-term liabilities 
-Short-term liabilities 
-Trade ~reditol""S 
Other liabilities {BUC'h 
as bank averdraf ts':' 
amounts set asidse for 
tax and dividents 
Total Asaeta: 
-Fixed assets (Aircraft':' 
spares and spare 
engines) 
-Land & buildings~ 
engineering plant and 
equipn-ent':' office and 
COID?.lter equipnent) 
-Long-term investments 
(Investment in associated 
and other companies) 
-Trade debtors less 
provision for doubtful 
debt.a 
-Cash & bank balanees 
-Other current assets 
(Quoted investments & 
conS1J1Dable stores) 
31 Hnrr.;rt l.9H3 31 t'.nrr..:h 1992 
S$m.i ii ir ..m. ~ ... ~. · 1 · .-:, 71. .l "Lt'.ICL % 
7 689 75.0 7 046 70. 7 
419 4. '1 452 4.5 
421 4.2 
1 
1 325 12.9 1 219 12.2 
757 7.4 8.4 
100.0 9 975 100.0 
-----------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
5 400 
1 781 
7 181 
1 004 
805 
702 
10 250 
52 .. 7 
17.4 
70.1 
5.4 
9.6 
7.8 
6.9 
100.0 
1 633 
6 175 
1 841 
611 
9 975 
45.5 
16.4 
61.9 
5.2 
8.3 
18.5 
6.1 
100.0 
-----------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
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~arl 31/3/92, 
2. The figures a,,.·ailable for Japan Airlines are for year ended 
31/3/92 
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Key: ATK 
RTK 
N/A 
L5ept:·eci~_tir.Jl'c. Pr.Jlicies fr ...rt· Ait:--r...:re.ft, :3po.res a:r1r-J. 
!3p;j .. -C'e E·cigi·rc.es 
SS 
SIA formulated a clear and challenging mission and corporat·e 
goals which provide a sense of direction for the Airline. 
The Airline has been profitable since its in.....--eption in 1972. It 
has steadily grown fr-om a tin)· airline in 1972 to being a large 
Airline at present. It has often embarked on new aircraft. purchases 
largely from its retained earnings resulting in it having one of the 
most· modern aircraf·t fleets in the world. 
The Airline adopted and consistently successfully implemented the 
differentiation strategy. The Airline differentiated its services 
through providing a high qualit!f of customer ser-..dce both in flight. 
and on the ground~ by being innovative and providing new and exciting 
service features ahead of its competitors. 
SIA established efficient and effective distribution systems for 
its services and was a founder partner of the Abacus Distribution 
System. The Airline extensively markets its services to create a 
brand image of a ~high quality of ser'\>·ice~ airline in all its market 
segments. 
SIA set up global alliances with various like minded airlines. 
The benefits of these cooperative arrangements include sharing airport 
lounges~ joint trade promotion~ inter-changeable tour packages~ cargo 
automation programmes and global express ser....-ices f·:>r small parcels. 
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The ~. i 1:· line 
the highest in the wr.;rld~ 
3.5 Canclusiara.s 
Some important lessons '9"ere derived from the study of successful 
turnarounds of BA and SAS and the study of SIA,. a consistently 
profitable airline for over 20 years. These lessons are discussed 
below:-
It is necessary for an airline to have a mission which is 
basically the overall aim or purpose of the organisation. 1t.. is also 
necessary to have clear,. challenging and actionable corporate goals. 
The study of BA .and SAS highlighted the need for strong,. 
competent and committed top management to effect successful 
turnarounds. It is the top management. who then formulate the 
appropriate mission,. goals'\' objecti,,,·es and .strategies to ·effect the 
turnaround of airlines. 
SAS was a private airline {not Government owned and controlled) 
when it effected its t.urn:ar'Ound and management had a free hand to 
adopt the strategies they deemed fit to effect the turnaround. SIA 
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l~.rger th~:n the 
SIA consistently adopted a differentiation strategy. Such a 
strategy involves extra costs of providing the differentiation 
features such as a modern,. aestheticalli..- appealing jets,, a high 
quality of both in flight and on the ground customer service and 
introducing new innovative features ahead of the competitors. SADC 
airlines,. due to their poor economic and financial performance,. are 
ill equipped to adopt a differentiation strategy. 
BA,. SAS and S1A·s emphasis on human resource training and 
development under 1 ine the fact that people are the most important 
resource in the airline imlentory. "This is because the airline 
product is a seMrice subject to personal or subjecti,,.·e assessment,. and 
it is necessar'IJ to produce a high quality of service the first time. 
The extensive training and personnel development undertaken by SIA is 
reflected in extremely high levels of staff productivity. Adopting 
such an approach should result in SAIC airlines markedly improving 
their staff productivity. 
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4. 
4.1 
PRAGMATIC 
STRATEGIES FOR 
Introduction 
TURNAROUND 
SADC AIRLINES 
In chapter 2, a literature research was carried out pertaining 
to the identification of the ideal strategies for success of airlines. 
In the third chapter, a stud!f of British Airways, SAS and SIA revealed 
the successful application of .some of the strategies discussed in 
chapter 2. 
In this chapter, pr.a:gmatic strategies which may be used to 
turnaround SADC airlines will be discussed, based on the research in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
4.2 Cost Leadership Strategy 
4.2.1 General 
The cost leadership strateg_v depicted in Figure 2.2 (Vide 2.3.1) 
seeks to achie,,.·e production efficiency, market/service efficienc:zt and 
cost efficienc)" in all areas of the operations of an airline. There 
is a lot of scope for SAI:C management to drastic.a:lly cut cost.s in all 
aspects of airline operations as highlighted in Sections 4. 2. 2 to 
4..2.4. 
103 
~:rs:rJ. 
Tt1is 
r.1.re opt imr.s.l ly u.t i 1. ised to m.i"t"d.m.ise 
facilities wh.il.e s~.ie 
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134:- 1.36) .. 
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l • 
.... l..nes~ 
Executive Officer a:ctd 5-till 5"lJ.bsidizes these pr.J.ra..st'.j_tals whe·n they 
step,, . 'l..'ll 
Such a policy change is likely to sol,,.·e some of the deficiencies 
of SADC airlines reported by SA"fCC & World Bank such as inadequate 
management. (or cost.") accounting ski 1 ls. Such skills are required for 
making decisions on such aspects as pricing-:- investment and route 
structures as well as route profitabilitl" calcul.at.ions, cash flow 
projections-:- capital expenditure control and analysis-of sales by 
point of sales. Such a policy change should sol~-e such deficiencies 
as lack of adequat·e management information systems {MIS) {SATCC .& 
World Bank 1992 16) or lack of appreciation by ~~nagement of the 
need for an effective MIS as a crucial management tool. 
1:')5 
Existing 
t,-C4'!;:rk.et 
se~ .. t ' 1.TL 
" !~ectiot1 2 .. 3 .. 3 .. 
Table 4. .1 shows what SAT(."C & World Bank ( 1:9fJ2 12) pro:Ject.ed 
would be aircraft required in SAI'IC in 1996. Because of the present 
oversupply of capaci t!I,. it was projected that much fewer .e;ircraft than 
63 (Table 4. 2'),. th.at is only 52 would be required to satisfy the size 
of the e}dsting markets plus any projected increase in demand in 1996,. 
even if SAL'tC airlines continued operating individually. Some 
efficiency improving measures such ,35 more efficient scheduling would 
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fleets. 
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However .. ther-e is a lot of intense competition in the long 
haul markets. This was ushered in by the opening up of the 
economies of most SADC states following the adoption of the World 
Bank/International Monetary Fund sponsored Economic Structural 
Adjustment Progr:ammes (ESAP"). ESAP was introduced in Zimbabwe in 
1990. In the case of Air Zimbabwe,. the competition include that 
from large carriers like Air France .. British Airways .. Lufthansa:, 
Swiss.air .. KLM .. TAP and South African Airways. The competition 
embrace.s all the four elements of the marketing mix .. including the 
price. There is an opportunit!" for SAL'{;~ airlines to be low cost 
leaders.. for example, b!" taking ad.,,.~anta·ge of their relatively low 
labour costs. Hence, they may be able to compete effectively on 
price and yet maintain adequate yields. 
::09 
4.2~4 Cost R-f'fi.ci.ency 
a. Fuel Costs 
SAI'C airlines have within their fleets some ageing aircraft 
such as Boeing 707s,. Boeing 737-200s') DC-Bs and DC-10s (see 
Table 4.3). Fuel costs can be minimised by replacing these 
ageing aircraft with more modern fuel efficient .aircraft such 
as the Boeing '737-400s or 500s') Boeing 767s and MD-SOs. 
However,. the capital costs of new aircraft tend to be .,..·ery 
high compared to the book 'i'alues of the ageing aircraft the!'· 
will be replacing hence the need to take a~vantage of the low 
operating costs of modern aircraft though greater aircraft 
utilisation. 
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SADC airline fleets are composed of aircraft of many different 
varieties {see Table 4. 2 ') . The Southern African Economist 
(1988:3) .a:lso reported that SAI.'CC airline.s owned (in 1987} 68 
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l!1:nd the BAe 146. 
As of mid 1995,. Air Zimbabwe had a fleet of ten aircraft made 
up of five varieties namely three Boeing 737s,. tW'O Boeing 
767s,. two Boeing 707s,. one BAe 14.6 and two Fokker .50s. Such a 
mixed fleet results in increased costs of such aspects as 
pilot training,. maintenance training,. the costs of spare parts 
inventories and the overall complexity of operations {Doganis 
1992 : 161). For cost efficient operations,. it is necessary 
that the number of different aircraft for a carrier be 
limited. 
c. Airline Integration 
SADC airlines are likely to benefit significantly if their 
operations were integrated. C'.ost savings would result from 
economies of scale in bulk purchase of spares,. integrated 
training facilities,. shared maintenance facilities,. joint 
marketing of services and coordinated purchase of aircraft,. 
among other benefits. Man)· SADC route.s overl.ap,. so the 
benefit of network integration will arise if excess aircraft 
are sold (SATCC & World Bank 1992 : 12 and Table 4.1) or if 
new markets are found. 
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The discussion above appear to confirm the practicality of 
implement.ing the ideal strategies for SAI'C airlines di8C'Ussed in 
Section 2.8.1 and 2.8.3. The ideal strategy of cost leadership can 
be adopted because there is a lot of SC"Ope to increase production 
efficienc)·., market/service efficienc)· and cost efficiency. The 
same arguments are applicable if a cost focus strategy is chosen. 
4.3 Cost Focus Strategy 
4.3.1 General 
An airline employing the cost focus strategy concentrates on a 
particular segment of the market and applies a cost leadership 
strateg)-. 
4.3.2 Focus on Regional Operations 
SADC airlines could focus their operations on regional {within 
Africa) or domestic routes. SAI'IC airlines are more knowledgeable 
about the market needs of the region and how to satisfy those needs 
than international #mega-carriers#., for instance. In the regional 
routes,. SADC carriers could operate feeder services to regional 
hubs such as Harare., Lusaka,. Johannesburg., Nairobi or Addis Ababa. 
A broadly-targeted #meg.a-carrier# like British Airways may be 
bearing higher than necessary costs in serving,. for instance,. the 
SADC market b:z,.· using l.ar-ge aircraft for feeder ser,,.·ices within 
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4.3.6 
It appears that the cost focus strategy can only be profitably 
employed by focusing on regional and possibly domestic routes while 
also cooperating either regionally or elsewhere to optimise the use 
of the expensive facilities and resources. 
4.4 Alliances 
The three generic turnaround strategies would best be 
implemented if SADC airlines were integrated or if they closely 
cooperated as explained in Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4(c). An 
integrated SADC airline could,. as discussed before,. result in 
massive cost savings through :economies of scale. Similarly,. a 
focus strategy., focusing on regional operations,. would be 
facilitated if the~a was an integrated regional airline. 
Individually,. SAI'C airlines are too weak to compete against 
international 'mega-carriers'. If regional airline integration is 
not possible,. at least some few regional airlines could pull their 
resources together to share risks and costs. As discussed in 
Chapter 3,. SIA formed alliances with like minded airlines for the 
benefit of all the particip~ting airlines. British Airways merged 
with British Caledonian Airways in order to form a stronger .. meg.a 
carrier .. best suited to meet. any challenge globally. SAS belongs 
to three Nordic countries namel~· Sweden .. Denmark and Norwa?,.i·,. making 
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SADC airlines should t.a}:::e adv,.~antage of increased aut.omation by 
using the data used for making reservations to produce sales 
statistics~ revenue accounting, invoices as well as tickets and 
boarding passes. T"ne terminals connected to the CRS should extend 
from airline offices and travel agents to major companies which 
frequently use air transport. These companies would also have 
ticket printers but would be linked to a travel agent or airline 
office who would monitor the transactions and issue the invoices. 
4.6 Capital Structure 
SADC airlines needs to match long term sources of finance 
namely long term debt, equity and provisions with long term or 
permanent assets such as aircraft, ground equipment and buildings. 
There is also need for an optimum mi.x of debt and equity. lf there 
is too much debt, there is a risk that the airline may fail t.o pay 
its creditors especi.ally when interests rat·ea are high and this 
could result in an airline being liquidated as was the case with 
Zambia Airways in early December 1994. An optimum mix of equity to 
long term capital is 30 to BO per cent. {SATCC & World Bank 1988 : 
67) with 30 per cent being the barest minimum. The target varies 
with risk in the airline businesa as well as how tangible the 
assets a.re and the ease with which the assets can be sold. 
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4.7 Conclusians 
The discussion above point to the viability of adopting either 
the cost leadership or cost focus strategies as the most pragmatic 
turnaround strategies for Sir.DC airlines. 
The cost leadership strategy would require SADC airlines to be 
much more efficient than .at present. Cost efficiency can be 
achieved through minimising fu-el costs by replacing ageing fuel 
inefficient aircraft with more modern fuel efficient aircraft; 
through rationalising the aircraft types in a fleet and through 
economies of scale which would arise if SAIC airlines were 
integrated. Market efficiency would be achieved through high load 
factors.,. high airer.aft utilisation.,. as well as disposal of excess 
aircraft. Production efficiency would be achie,~·ed through 
efficient and effective airline scheduling and through higher 
employee productivity. 
The focus strategy could be profitably employed by focusing on 
regional and possibly domestic routes. 
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5. INTERNAL.AND EXTERNAL APPRAISAL 
5 _ 1 Int.1:"0duct. ion 
Various factors ha,··e contributed to the poor ~rformance of SADC 
air 1 ines. Some of the factors are internal or within management 
control~ thus reflecting some weal-messes within SADC airlines. Some 
of the factors are outside the control of the airlines-~ emanating from 
the external or operating en1dronment. 
In this chapter.,. we shall first analyse the pre-sent situation 
pertaining to the internal en,l"iroP.JDent of SAIC airlines.,. in particular 
that of Air Zimbabwe. This is carried out using the Mc-Kinsey 7-S 
framework to reveal weaknesses and strengths. The appraisal or 
assessment is done to see if the internal structure.,. strategies.,. 
staffing.,. st:?tle of management., systems {management information., 
accounting system.,. quality control S,?."Stems.,. maintenance systems among 
others), skills and shared values (superordinate goals) within SADC 
airlines are appropriate for the recommended stratemt of cost 
l·eadership {the broad based or focus strategy). 
The internal analysis is followed by an analysis of the 
external/operating environment of SADC airlines. This comprise the 
economic~ political.,. social.,. technological.,. regulatory and ecological 
environment. The ob,jective of the anal!i'·sis is to reveal opportunities 
which can be exploited b!i'· SADC airlines as well as threats which ought 
to be overcome in order to .achieve optimal re-sul ts thrcug;,"l 
implementing the cost leadership strategy. 
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The internal analysis of SAL~ .airlines is done with regard to the 
structure.,. skills.,. staffing,.. systems,.. st:i_.rle and 
superordinate goals {shared ,,.·alues). 
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Weaknesses 
Air Zimbabwe, like almost all SADC airlines, is government owned. 
The Airline is a parastatal. This is also the case with the 
national airlines of Botswana,. Lesotho,. Malawi,. Namibia and 
Tanzania. However,. the airlines of Mozambique and Angola are 
integral parts of a government department while the Royal Swazi 
Airline is a private company with half the equity being owned by 
the Government and the other half by the King of that country 
(SATCC & World Bank 1992 : 73). 
The Air Zimbabwe Corporation functions under the direction of a 
board appointed by the Minister of Transport and Energy. The 
General Manager is appointed by the board and has responsibility 
for the day-to-day operations of the corporation (Zimbabwe 1968 
: 324 - 329). 
SADC airlines typically have tall organisational structures 
(attempts to obtain an organisation structure for Air Zimbabwe 
by the author proved fruitless) comprising many layers of 
management compared to other international airlines (SATCC & 
World Bank ( 1992 77)) . This lengthens the lines of 
communication from the point of decision to the point of action. 
Thi.s is likely to result in distortion of information as it moves 
up and down the organisation .. s ladder,. results in delays in 
making decisions and with the consequent general inefficiency of 
the airlines. 
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St'l"ategic chr.;.rtge is imped.ed ira. sw:.~h 1.:f. t~.ll f" ..n:·ga:ni.satiorl.F.l.l 
st'l"J.c+ .. 1.l't"e. ACCf".}rdi·ca.g t .. r.J r.ta.i·caa., Mintz.berg &. ~JF.smes { 1988 : 550 -
551), r.1. t.ro:rea.:w:.:ri!l.tic ~-tracture is all right i·ca. a st1.:f.ble 
*:mvi-r<.Jranent tJJrl. in the r.lyc0mir..: ercNi"['O"CaneTa.t. i·n which "De live, ·a.er.a 
problems cr,,·c&.St.1.:f.:rit .. ly 1.:f."['ie;e. Th.ese ra.r.sra.-rr.sat..i·ne PE"Qblem.s te·nd to 
be prl.Sb.ed llJi the hieraTr.:hy whif"..:h le>!f.d..s to t .. ,,,p ml:l.r1.F.1.geme1d:. beira.g 
overloF.1.ded. T01, ~Ttt. tends to get. sr.1 enmeshed in ,..,,·perating 
problems thr.;.t they lose sight of strategic coTtSideratir..r~.s. 
Stt:·a.tegy im.plememtat.ir.sra. is ,,,ftern im,;:~ded t.r,; the p:rE:"1alence f'.Jf 
actira.g a.ppr.Ji·ntme-rtts within the t.r.JJi managemer1.t. Fr,.;'l" exmuple,. Air 
Zimbabwe had 1.:f.n actirtg Ge-ne"C'al ~a.ager frrma Au.grJ.St 1991 to 
October 1993. This p'l"ar.:tir..:e is Pl"'F.!V'a.le·nt iTL SADC ai"C'lir1.es (SATCC 
& War ld Baxtk. 1992 : 77) • 
b. Stra:tegy 
SADC airlines do not pursue specific strategies to gain a 
competitive edge over their competitors. No SADC airline has 
pursued say a co:st leadership,. differentiation or focus strategy .. 
No serious efforts have,. for example,. been made to integrate or 
for close cooperation among some or all SADC airlines so as to 
benefit from economies of BCale through joint marketing of 
services~ coordinated procurement of aircraft and spares~ 
rationalisation of fleets or joint training of personnel,. among 
other things. 
Al though there are numerous dynamic changes in the operating 
environment,. management do not appear to have come up with 
12.5 
c_ Skills 
The 
.... ,. ..... l 
l'"J.&.C.•~~ 
The nature of services that airlines offer requires highly 
qualified and skilled personnel such a.s aircraft engineers and 
technicians,. pilots,. economists,. financial and management. 
accountants,. financial analysts and marketing specialists. SADC 
airlines have recognised the need for adequately trained 
personnel in the t·echnical and operational areas. 'Pilots,. 
engineers and technicians are trained and licensed to 
international standards as required by law. The civil aviatioL 
administration authorities carry out periodic supervision and 
inspect.ion to en.sure that the stringent training requir-ement.s are 
adhered to (SATCC & World Bank 1992 78 - 79). 
SATCC & World Bank (1992 79 - 80) re\l'ealed that. most SADC 
airlines do not seem to appreciate also the need for 'irf-ell trained 
and qualified personnel in the rest of the areas of airline 
activity. Apart from some qualified personnel such as 
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d. Sta:f"fing 
The Air Zimbabwe Board consists of the General Manager,. ex 
officio,. and five members appointed blf' the Minister of Transport. 
and Energy for a term not exceeding three 1,rears. The Air 
Zimbabwe Act {Section 7) specifies certain disqualifications for 
appointment as members of the Board. These include persons who 
are not citizens of Zimbabwe,. an unrehabilitated insolvent and 
a person who has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. 
The Act does not specify the qualifications required for one to 
be a member of the Airline Board. A Committee of Inquiry into 
Air Zimbabwe headed by Justice LG Smith (1956 : 12) found that 
some members with limited educational and professional 
backgrounds or some with heavy commitments or interests outside 
the corporation sometimes become Board members. Sometimes a 
vacancy within the Board takes a long time to be filled. 
The Committee of Inquiry into Air Zimbabwe {1986 : 15 - 25) also 
found that some of the problems faced by Air Zimbabt,,.."e can be 
traced back to the Board. The Board failed to come up with a 
management structure which allows t.he Airline to respond to the 
challenges of the Corporation. A programme of cost containment 
could have been pursued and the Airline management could have 
been mobi1i.sed to see how costs could be reduced and revenues 
increased. The Board could have consistently resisted 
Ministerial interference in the day-to-da1t running of t.he Airline 
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(1) Management. Information Systems (MIS} 
Information S.!fStems need to be designed to focus on the 
initial tasks and decisions made within an organisation and 
to pro'\i"ide the kind of information that management needs t.o 
perform those tasks and make those decisions. The MIS 
reports should include general activity reports., 
performance reports and financial reports. General 
activity reports would highlight special projects or 
important events periodically {say monthly). Performance 
reports should be periodic (weekly., monthll'· or quarterly) 
production or traffic summaries for management. Financial 
reports should be for internal management analysis produced 
say monthly or quarterly and consi.sting of information on., 
for example., revenue., cost.a., cash flows and route 
performance. 
From my investigations {through "·isi ts and discussions with 
some Air Zimbabwe senior personnel) it appears that the MIS 
with Air Zimbabwe are largel1r informal in that. information 
seems to be passed to top management based on tiw"'O criteria: 
namely: 
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Air Zimbabwe has considerable computer capacity. Nearly 
all departments have micro-computers. there 
appears to be a t·endency for each department to produce 
their own data wit.bout sufficient regard to what other 
departments are doing. 
differences in the data. 
which of ten among 
Hence,. one of ten encounters 
One example is traffic figures 
say the aC"C"Ounting section,. 
operations section and the sales and marketing section. 
One major drawback of Air Zimbabwe~s MIS is that. the 
reports are generally never timely. For example,. audited 
Annual Reports are sometimes published after one to t'W'O 
years {Vide .5. 2 .1(e){2)). The information value of such 
reports would be of doubtful relevance in the dirnamic 
operating environment that the Airline operates in. 
!30 
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cr .. rca.t .. ·C"itF<J.te to the of the 
a. to concentrate on those aspects in which the}' are 
knowledgeable and ignore those areas in which the:?l 
feel inad·equate . 
b. to manage aC'C'Ording to the document-s that flow across 
their desks or as a result of their contacts with 
subordinates,. peers and superiors. 
c. to manage according to the pressures of issues of the 
moment. 
Most of the Airlines~ statistics are extracted from the 
Airline tickets. This includes sector and route 
statistics,. route revenue computations,. point of sale 
information and }deld analysis. However,. these tickets are 
also required for re\l·enue aC\....-ounting which is normally done 
manuall:?t as a matter of priority thereby relegating the 
collect.ion or extraction of Airline statistics as a 
secondar?t role. The result is that vital statistics 
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Air Zimbabwe" like most SADC airlines, has not 
developed a proper system for costin_g its ser,,.·ices 
(SATCC Sc World Bank 1&'92 : 88}. Accurate and reliable 
cost information is required for making pricing, 
investment and other decisions (Brits & Smuts 1992 
149). These costs ought to be aC"C"umulated per c-ost 
centre, per route, per passenger or per airer.aft. type. 
In fact, a proper cost accounting system is a 
prerequisite for an efficient and effective management-
information system. . 
132 
r..i.ir 1 i"cs.es is ttaa.t cf 
'Wr ..11:· ld EV£nk ( 1992 4:8} 
mr.i:rket:o ~.11 tt:u::: SA.DC a.irlines were mr.;.ki·r;,g losses of 
"t"e la.t ive ly high a:nd. a.lso 
The Ab:· 
a. load i'j.11 its 
r .... -ut of total r1r..n:aest ic 
SATCC· Wry~·lrl ( 1992 48} the 
to E.ilJ.ita.ble f;:;:re 
healthy 
of 
133 
lr.,n.rl }fie lrls .. 
of. SP.DC 
SAOC 
+,... 
'~'""' 
is 
.; .,., 
"'-" 
ref iected 
is 
is 
f ,,-,. •.J'<-
4.'9} ee..--t i112.ted. the foreign ClJ.rrency 
rJ.eficit..s fr.J-r ttte 
a.:nd · ca.pitr.s.1 
134 
.;.,_ 
....... 
7-:f .. 6 
meet 
term. 
sa .. lr_, .. ries, Ttc.ere is 
. . l ce: .. pi"tta 
e.t 
e. 
e .. s 
to 
The '"C'7.S.t ir.J 
tr.; +i--,,o ,,,,,,,, ..... 
rlet.;t in Ta.ble 
.:;. .,o(..t. .z:,,.,,..,..l!!.m ~ '?'~"11'="""".c.t•,,,+ 0 ~+ "7..".b."6""', L ,-:r.1~..,. .... ... "" .... • ·1 ·1 ........ ,.j,.,.,,.. ~ ... ,., P,'? ... 1 .... 1 .
.._,.,s,, .... ~<=is,, r;"'·.J>·au.·••'""" ,_,_,,, ~'fir.-> - _ .;;;_ •-" "" - ~ -, 
3fJ .. JlZCle 1991 .. 
(Table 5. lJ _ The Airlhle-s 
li-c.pl.id.i ty 
63}. 
1313 
Air Zimbabwe Corporation 
Balance Sheet as at 30 June 1991 
{Air Zimbabwe Annual Report 1990/91.,. 1992 -
Capital Employed 
Capital Reserve {Equity) 
Loans 
Advances 
Less Accumulated I'i-eficit 
1990 
Z$ 000 
258558 
43675 
304249 
18275 
285974 
2016 
13) 
1991 
Z$ 000 
2016 
312278 
167679 
481973 
63108 
418865 
------- -------
Employment of Capital 
Fixed Assets 
Current Assets: 
Stores 
Trade Debtors 
Government grant 
Cash Resources 
Current Liabilities: 
Sales in advance of 
80814 
52342 
9000 
27223 
169379 
191.55 carriage 
Creditors 
Current portion of 
Interest payable 
Bank overdraft. 
271J:.t9 
loans 76290 
1998 
Provision for aircraft 
overdraft and 
maintenance 
Net Current Liabilities 
51221 
9267 
155060 
-------
-------
-------
301655 
15681 
235974 
------
------
137 
91539 
61293 
26700 
81915 
261447 
40101 
32638 
106580 
33387 
51969 
9594 
284269 
------
------
-------
441687 
22822 
418865 
l ie.t.Ji lit ies of Z:$22,822 
1991 ind.ic>';J.t i-£1g ·per.fr:· 
The t ... t1B:t ... ii!1.ll 
The 
i3B) r.s.t 
fJ!3:$75 mi i 1 ir.rct. to 1.:uq.srcr.1e 
sa.l~.'l"'ies 
{3) 
8ADC 
which 
ser'J'l..ces .... SATCC &. Wo-r ld. Bank { 1992 
steep .. , .. ises 
while 
of f~:l·es 
~-...... 
....... 
prr ..rfit ... r.s.ble 
125 
82)-
1~39 
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the 
f~.re 
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; 52 - 53) ~ 
Yields in the intercontinental market are generally too low 
due~ according to SATCC & World Bank {1992 : 63)~ to poor 
business and first class load factors and excessive 
discounting to obtain adequate load factors~ LAM being the 
only exception. Another reason for poor :?fields was said to 
be poor yield management as well as relati,,.·ely low 
northbound fares from Harare or Lusaka to Europe as shown 
in Table 5.2 below. 
Int.erline traffic is important. in all SAIK~ airlines. This 
is due to the fact that a large proportion of SAL'C airline 
business {with few exceptions) is interlfne because of t.he 
extremely limited route network {SAT'CC &World Bank 1992: 
58 - 89}. Howe\l·er~ the process of interline accounting is 
very involved requiring highly qualified personnel. In 
---·--·----i---------·------------·--.---------·----··----·---------------·-· 
I fARKS {US rmuRS) ! FARES PKR. IH {US CM'S) l 
r l --------- -----------.,-----------·~ 
!I OHK-wAY l ! CHK-wAY l I 
f WLL <DACH I APIX. RmJml . IUU.t mMlf ! APEX RmJmJl ; i ---·--r--- --+-----,---i-----i-·--------:------r-----; 
1 1 HORm 1 oom1 1 tmmimumltmm'smmlHORm 1 ~~! i-----------J,----- I --- ' ---1 ------l--·----· .. --1·-----~---·1 
! fl.AP.ARE I 8f:i9 i i-417 344 11)02 ! l.Q,8 ' 11,2 I 5_1 !! 6,1 i 
I I I ! ! ! i I . . . . 
i LUSAKA i 1202 W:IT 1024 975 I 15_2 I U)_ l l 6,5 i 6,2 
I 1 ! r 1 1 i 
J .~)~B!-~L ________ ~l.34_ i 1246 i!.}79 ~170 l 12_!? i_ 13,8 I !i:!~__l ____ _?-5 __ ; 
Te.b le 5, 2 Inte·ccr.;ra.t i·ca.e1"ttl'}.l f~:res betwee·n Srftl.th:F.f~'Ct Af-r·ic~. ~:earl E~.rt:·cl'.~e 
( S~,TGG & WoY· ld. &:ca.k 1992 ::: 64) -
f-r.,l:·eign ce.rriers {SATCI.~ & World Be:nk l~~l : 9fJ - 91) ~ 
"f. St.yle 
Air Zimbabwe had been wit.bout. a substanti.,..~e General Manager 
since August 1991 to October 1993. Therefore., no stlde of 
management could be discerned during this period. The 
pre,.rious General Manager., Mr F Musara., had been dismissed 
on charges of corruption and mismanagement. Prior to his 
appointment.,. there had also been a relatively long period 
when the Airline was without a substantive General Manager 
following the dismissal of the previous General Han.ager., Mr 
Mutyambizi.,. in early 1986 on charges of corruption and 
mi.sman.agem-ent. In fact, a Committee of Inq.uiry into Air 
Zimbabwe Corporation under the chairmanship of Justice L.G. 
Smith had been convened and reported in July 1986. They 
substantiated., among other things.. the allegations of 
incompetence,. corruption .eind mismanagement against Mr 
Mut!tambiz.i.. the dismissed General Manager {Zimbabwe 1986 : 
39 - .51). Mr Mutyambizi had himself been appointed Gener.al 
Manager in December 1983. Prior to this,. there had been ar.. 
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Strengths 
SAIC airlines are largely owned by the Governments. This 
has enabled :the airlines to receive subsidies when they 
face financial difficulties. This has also enabled the 
airlines to procure expensive capital equipment such as 
aircraft and related ground support equipment with 
Government guarantees. 
SADC airlines are members of IATA. This has allowed them 
to participate in the coordination of technical standards 
and ~ervices with other airlines and they benefit from 
training and technical assistance programmes. 
b_ Skills 
SADC airlines have the human resources to carry out most of 
the specialised functions nece.ssary to keep aircraft 
flying. Pilots~ engineers and technicians are trained and 
licensed to international standards as required by law. 
The civil aviation administration authorities carr!t' out 
periodic supervision and inspection to ensure that the 
stringent training requirements are adhered to (SATCC & 
t,,._ , ~ ~ k 1c-9r• ... o '""°' "\ ffUr l.a tsan ~ :tJ .!! : tu - / :v, . Some of the airlines such as 
Air Zimbabwe have advanced and well equipped training 
facilities. 
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c_ Sta:f'fing 
Within SAI'C countries.. there are people wh-o are well 
educated and familiar with what is required to run airlines 
effecthrely. Should the SADC airline em~·ironment improve .. 
that it.. if the airlines are not bound by civil service 
regulations so that they can be able to recruit.. promote 
and adequately remunerate competent personnel .. then such 
persons may find it ~"Orthwhile .. rewarding and challenging 
to work for SADC airlines. Such are the people who can 
comprise the airline boards and top management and who can 
spearhead the turnaround of their airlines. 
d. Systems 
Some SAIC airlines such as Air Zimbabwe ha,,.·e considerable 
computer capacity which can be exploited to produce the 
required MIS .. CRS and automated ticketing system. 
SAL\C countries ha\>·e personnel who are trained and qualified 
in accounting and finance. Such personnel should be able 
to produce timely and relevant. financial aC'\...-ounts should 
the envirorh..~nt permit.. for instance.. if top management 
specify their info:nnation requirements.. set deadlines and 
have a free hand in recruiting the right calibre of 
personnel and adequately remunerate them without political 
or other interference. 
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5_3 s~ 
The 7-S model has allowed the examination o.f the internal 
environment and highlight some weaknesses and so-me .strengths of SAI'IC 
airlines especially Air Zimbabwe. Some of the weaknesses included a 
tall organisation structure,. a management style which is at odds with 
the cost leadership strategy,. o,,.~erstaffing,. lack of adequately 
qualified personnel in the administrative areas,. low productivity,. 
failure to institute adequate systems to deal with the information and 
accounting requirements and the absence of superordinate goals to bind 
the organisation together. The airlines also face acute financial 
problems. Some of the str-engths include membership of IATA,. 
qualified and competent personnel in spe-ciali.sed functions of 
airlines,. availability of considerable computer capacitl" in some 
airlines which c-ould be e:-:ploited to produce the required MIS,. CRS and 
automated tickets,. as well as adequate maintenalli..-e systems,. pilot,. 
technical and cabin crew training systems. 
5.4 External Appraisal 
In this Section the external environment,. particularly of Air 
Zimbabwe., is examined,. that is,. economic,. technological,. social,. 
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Presently~ Harare is one of the major hubs within SAI'tC. 
However~ with the normalisation of the political situation 
in South Africa~ the importance of Johannesburg as a major 
hub is increasing further~ completely overshadowing Harare. 
b. Technological Environment 
The majority of aircraft in the SAI'C airline fleet are 
ageing (Vide 4.2.3 (a)). 'There is need to re-equip the 
SADC fleet for a number of reasons namely: 
i. Newer aircraft. like the Boeing 787 and MD-11s have 
better fuel econom?r than older .aircraft like the 
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of f'ftJ~t ?rt ... two 
airlines. 
iii. SADC airlines have to compete with European carriers 
employing the new g~neration of modern aircraft such 
as the MI.'t-11s operated by Swissair and the Boeing 747-
400s operated b!l British Airways,, Quantas and Air 
France. 
The capital cost of new aircraft. is ~·ery high indeed 
especially compared to the book values of the older 
aircraft the!f will be replacing. Most SADC airlines,. which 
are technically bankrupt as discussed before {Vide 5.2.1 e 
{2)') and are net consumers of sc-arce foreign exchange,, do 
not have internally generated funds to purchase new 
aircraft. The SADC governments h.ave generally not fared 
any bett·er lr1ith huge external debts and relying a lot on 
aid from the developed countries. Various financing 
schemes ha,,..e been employed to purchase new aircraft.. As 
discussed before~ Air Zimbabwe has had to largely rely on 
borrowing from local and external financial insti tut.ions. 
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The regulation of aircraft noise is an important and 
significant issue to all concerned. To many SAI.'C airlines,. 
it represents another un~relcome restriction on their 
commercial operations and a serious threat to their 
v iabi 1 i ty. Some SAIC aircraft do not me·et the I CAO Anne=-~ 
16 Chapter 2,. let alone Chapter 3 requirements. Chapter 1 
aircraft such as Boeing 701s and DC-Ss are still flying in 
SADC fleets. The move towards Chapter 3 compliance are 
underway and SADC airlines would need a major re-equipment 
exercise to meet these requirements within the next decade 
if the airlines wish to continue operations into the 
European and North American markets. 
e. Legal Environment 
All SADC airlines were decreed into e:i:istence by their 
Government..s. As mentioned before,. the Enabling Act for Air 
Zimbabwe requires the Airline t.o operate on sound 
commercial principles but then goes further to severely 
limit the management. ... s freedom of action to formulate and 
implement strategies they deem necessary. 
Air transport within SAIC is regulated through a system of 
bilateral air services agreements or treaties between the 
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The routes operated by SADC airlines could be expanded to 
include destinations in North and South America:- Middle 
East and South East Asia due to the increasing economic 
ties with these regions since there are ~·ery few or no 
direct links with these destinations. This should be 
considered only after a thor-ough market research about the 
viability of the routes. 
Labour costs within SADC are very low compared with their 
competitors who are largely f ro..in Europe. This provides an 
oppcirtunity for SAI.'C airlines to pro,dde adequate l·evels of 
service at comparativel?f very low c-ost. This could enable 
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The performance of SADC airlines in their domestic markets 
is poor {Vide S.2.1.e {3)). This is because SAL'tC 
Governments tend to keep their domestic fares verit low. 
SADC Governments can take advantage of the current economic 
structural adjustment programmes to decontrol domestic 
fares and give the airlines a free hand to determine their 
own fares. This would provide an opportunity for the 
airlines to provide viable services only and discontinue 
services on those routes which may be unprofitable. 
Should SAL'IC airlines be commel"Cialised or priv.at.ised, 
management should t.ake advantage of their greater freedom 
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5_5 Summary 
The analysis of the ext·ernal environment of SADC airlines 
rev·ealed se\l·eral threats and opportunities. The threats include 
oversupply of capacity,. ageing fleets,. E'OOr distribution system 
(inadequate (."RS)" some aircraft which do not meet the current 1CAO 
noise stipulations" inadequate cooperation among SADC st.at.es and 
intense competition from mega carriers largely from Europe. There are 
a number of opportunities which could be exploited to overcome the 
weaknesses and threats facing SADC airlines. Airlines could be 
com.i-nercialised or privatised. Several benefits could arise from this. 
These include airline management subject to market discipline without 
political interference,. injection of equity capital into airlines and 
the ability to recruit high calibre of personnel to run the airlines. 
SADC airlines could take ad'l.>·antage of their low labour costs to offer 
150 
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An analysis of the internal em.dronment of SAI.'tC airlines re\\·ealed 
several weaknesses. These include a tall organisation structure~ no 
clear strategic direction':' Ministerial interference in the day-to-day 
operations of airlines~ o,,.·erstaffing.,. low-producthdty~ prevalence of 
unskilled personnel~ under-utilised facilities~ ineffecti,,.·e management 
information systems~ ageing fleets':' excess capacity:- under capitalised 
airlines:- heavy and crippling debts~ low fares in some markets~ 
foreign exchange losses due to interlining~ poor financial performance 
{persistent losses) and generally poor yields in most of their 
markets. 
The few strengths of SADC airlines include the existence of some 
qualified personnel in certain areas.,. go,,.·ernment. support:- some modern 
fuel efficient aircraft like the Boeing 767s and Fokker 50s~ some well 
developed training facilities in some countries like Zimbabwe and some 
relatively low "1age levels which could allow SADC airlines to compete 
against -mega-carrier.s·. 
The financial performance of SADC airlines is poor with all the 
airlines incurring losses. The fiercest competition for SADC airlines 
are faced in intercontinental routes. ln regional routes:- the 
performance of SADC airlines are comparativel.!,v better with t.he 
majority of airlines either making a profit or breaking even. In 
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6. STRATEGY ANALYSIS AND SELECTION 
6-1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, ideal strategies for the suC\..-ess of airlines were 
discussed. ln the third chapter, three airlines which did appl}.- some 
of the ideal strategies from Ch.apter 2 were discussed. The lessons 
learnt from the successful turnarounds of BA and SAS together with 
conclusions drawn from the study of SIA in the same chapter revealed 
possible strategies which could, with .appropriate modifications and 
adaptations, be adopted by SAI'(;~ airlines. 
In the fourth chapter, pragmatic strategies to turnaround SADC 
airlines, namely the cost leadership or cost focus strategies, were 
derived. This was followed by the study of the internal and external 
environments of SADC airlines in C.."hapter 5. The analysis of SADC 
airlines revealed several weaknesses which include tall organisational 
structures, poor management style, overstaffing, inadequately 
qualified personnel, low productivit~r, inadequate management 
information systems, the absence of shared values to bind the airline 
toget.her as well as acute financial problems. SADC airlines are 
facing int.ense competition from the sophisticated mega carriers 
largely from Europe. However, the opportunities for cost effective 
operations were also highlighted. These could arise from closer 
regional cooperation resulting in rationalised services a.nd the 
elimination of excess capacity, .among other benefit. 
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Therefore~ although close airline cooperation within SAI'C could 
result in large cost sa".dngs as discussed earlier .. such close 
cooperation is not expected in the short or medium term (within the 
next ten years) .. if ever at. all. Hence.. other more workable 
cooperative efforts need to be explored. 
A study of S!A {Vide 3.4.8) showed th.at cooperative ventures work 
best. when like minded airlines come together. SIA formed global 
alliances wit.h Delta Airlines and Swiss.air,. all three airlines being 
world renowned for a high quality of serv·ice., sound balance sheets .. 
consistent profitabilit1r and sound emplolree relations. 
The first step for SAI.'i(.~ airlines may be to forget about narrowing 
their cooperative efforts within S.AI.'IC. SA.DC and its predecessor .. 
SADCC,. was formed by politicians for largely political reasons. At 
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The above scenario of .a cooperative arrangement. among three 
airlines should be much easier to ag~ee upon than one involving ten 
SADC countries. Such an arrangement could be operational within a 
relatively short. period of say three ?.rears. The specific structure 
of the arrangement ma!,i' not be "~ery critical as long as close 
cooperation and sharing of facilities and rationalising of operations 
takes place. 
The three airline scenario depicted above would still result in 
a tiny airline but mo.st likely much stronger than the individual 
airlines. This .arrangement would be in a mu-ch better posit.ion to .seek 
strategic marketing alliances elsewhere, for ex.ample~ with European 
or some Far Eastern airlines such as Cathay Pacific or SIA. 
To achieve cost leadership~ it would be critical for some 
al 1 iance or cooperative arrangements to be made with some of the 
sophisticated airlines in Europe~ America or the Far East. This would 
allow SADC airlines to have access to the technology and management 
methods to enable the airlines to compete effectively in international 
markets. It is unlikely that SAD<:. countri·es or an!-'· combination of 
SADC airlines would ha,,.~e the skills and resources to carry out. 
marketing research and the .actual international marketing to reach the 
customers in the de"·eloped world. Partnership with airlines from the 
developed or newl!i~ industrialised countries may be cost effective. 
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6.3 Focus Strategy 
The majority of SAI.'tC airlines are profitable on regional routes 
while domestic and intercontinental routes are largely unprofitable 
{vl."de r ~ 1 ·~\) .o • .i..._.e f...i..1 • It may be prudent to build on this succ-ess on 
regional operations where there is less competition from international 
#mega-carriers# and where SADC carriers are very knowledgeable about 
the market needs and how to satisfy those needs. In these regional 
routes.,. SADC carriers could be operating feeder services to regional 
hubs such as Harare.,. Lusaka.,. and Johannesburg within SADC as well as 
Nairobi.,. Addis Ababa.,. and others outside SADC. To avoid dilution of 
yields through predatory competition from the #mega-carriers#.,. legal 
restrictions can be imposed to limit competition by airlines frorr. 
outside SADC on regional routes. 
Domestic operations within SAl'C could be made profitable by fare 
,, , t ··u·• :. ,., 1 ....... , ... aaJUS"t-men s t. v· iae -iJo. ~. - • e {. ~,j , • Air f a~es in some countries are kep~ 
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b. It.. is necessary to sa,,.·e costs through simplification of 
reser\>""ation and ticketing procedures. The largely manual 
ticketing services could be automated as well as the 
passenger check-in/o,~t and baggage handling. Production 
efficiency could be enhanced through reduction in st.af f 
numbers. 
c. Aircraft standardi.sat.ion would result in ser\>·ice eff icienc:i:t 
(Vide 4.2.3) _ It would also facilitate cooperation and the 
reaping of economies of scale among SAIC partners. 
To ensure service and production efficiency, it is also 
recommended that. aircraft utilisation be improved. To achieve this,. 
it would be necessary to have a coordinated route structure with an 
efficient hub and spoke system. Cooperating regional airlines should 
undertake joint scheduling of operations to ensure good connections 
for traffic to and from regional hubs. The correct aircraft type ar~d 
size for the traffic need to be employed. ·'i"'nere is also need for an 
even distribution of traffic during the week with increased 
frequencies where it is possible to do so. Aire-raft utilisation ought 
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l 
per a:rrnum. ( SATCC & Wr.Jl:" id &.:nk. 1992 : 7) . 
authority l!f."Cld freer.lrJm tr.J set.. ta-riffs t..r.J F.:f.llr..ra th.em t..r.J 8.dju.st them. 
costs i"n place r.;f t..h.e i~sent flat. -rat.es. Prr.nnot ir.J"Cli'.$.l fa.res with 
t'l"affic. Airli-ca.es mar.1.1.gemetlt.. sbr.mld be allr..Med tr.; effer.;t. a1l.tr..sma.tic 
fare ad .. iuetm.ents with cha.rages in sm:.:h varia.bles as fuel prices, 
Airli·ca.es sbr.ro.ld r-.;-nly opel:"F.:f.te 
assiE.-tance for t.h.e s;ieci-fic rrft.rt.e illl'a.d fr.Jr a. stii:t:0:la.ted level of 
6.4 Internal Ali.gument. 
The internal airline environment of SADC airlines would need to 
be changed so that the recommended strategy of cost focus can be 
effectively implemented. It is necessary that all the seven elements 
of the McKinsey 7-S framework are in unison to make the strategy work 
effectively as described below. 
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Strnctllre 
An organisation structu~e without too many layers of manageme~t 
and with shorter lines of communications is necessarJl for cost 
effective operations. Some posts especially in the administrative 
areas need to be reviewed with the objective of possibly abolishing 
them t.o minimise costs through product.ion efficienc)· (Vide 4.2.2). 
These changes are likely to be implemented if the airlines are run on 
commercial lines with minimal Government int.en,.ention except in area.s 
of policy only {with full consultations with airline management.). 
6.4.2 Strategy 
The top management of SADC airlines ought to formulate and 
implement a cost leadership strategy focusing on regional and domestic 
operations. The strategy ought to be designed so that all airline 
activities need to be at the lowest }?Ossible costs. Top management 
need to lead by example and the need to keep costs down ought to be 
communicated to all employees of the airlines. Employees at all 
levels should be encouraged to participate in coming up with ideas and 
programmes to minimise costs while not sacrificing safety and 
aC\..--eptable standards of service. The human resource policy ought. to 
ensure that employees who achieve performance targets at. minimal costs 
are adequate lJ.' rewarded and encouraged. 
Sight should not be lost of possible competition from surfac·e 
transport. and strategies should be designed to en.sure th.at cost 
effective ways to success.fully beat the competition are devised. All 
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to the 
Skills 
..... ..,.al.•,.,.,..,,,.. 1/ ... 1,..,.,...,. .,.+ -1.· ,.., 
L. ~t::r •.1&.UJ. ~~• .. 11,,41.~Q r.1 •-· 
To address the skills and staffing related problems within SADC 
airlines,. it is necessary to properly formulate a human resources 
policy_ Programmes to recruit,. train,. develop staff and to reward 
staff adequately would need to be implemented. To minimise costs,. 
airlines need to pool their resources together and cooperate either 
within the context of SADC or just a group of like minded airlines 
with partners in or outside SAIC. This is likely to be much more cost 
effecth··e than either having indh.-idual airlines setting up the 
extensive and costly training facilities which are necessar)· or 
sending personnel to developed countries to undertake general training 
which could inexpensh.-ely be undertaken within SADC. The training 
would also be tailored to the needs of the domestic or region.al 
markets. 
St.af':fing 
The SADC airline boards ought to be staffed b~· personnel of 
proven .abi l i t:i,.r and competence. The qualifications of board members 
ought to be specified in ad,~anc-e so that t.he composition of the board 
ref le ct the varied and complex acthdties that. the airlines are 
involved in. The board would then be in a position to provide 
leadership b,!.'· formulating appropriate policies for the airlines_ '?hie 
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ure.rk.et. 
There is need to review airline management information systems 
(MIS). Management. ought to clearly define their information 
requirements to ensure that summarised:- rele,,.·ant and ac-curate 
information required to ensure cost effective operations is brought 
to management·s attention timely and cost effectively (Vide 
5. 2 .1. 3( 1)). A common database need to be established to ensure that 
compatible decisions are made. 
If SADC airlines are operated on commercial lines\' then audited 
financial accounts are likely to be published in time. Management 
accounts would likely reflect relevant cost information to en.able 
operations to be conducted at lowest possible cost. To limit foreign 
currency liabilities due to interlining:- SAOC airlines ought to desist 
from writing tickets for foreign carriers unless more than fifty per 
cent of the revenue is carried on the rele1.rant SADC airline as is 
presently practised by Air Tanzania {SATCC & World Bank 1992 : 90). 
Non-residents ought to be required to pay their air fares in hard 
currenc:!r to reduce interline liabilities. 
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Style 
The top management and .specifically the Chief E.~ecuth.·e Officers 
of SADC airlines ought to adopt a more participative style of 
management. This should result in open and genuine comBP . .mication at 
all levels. Emplo~tees are likely to be more motivated to perform 
better if they feel that they were consulted on decisions affecting 
the well-being of their organisation. Govern.inent Ministries ought to 
limit their intervention in the running of airlines to directions on 
policJ,r only. 
I 
5_4_7 Superordinate Goals (Shared Values) 
There is need for SADC airlines, adopting a cost focus strategy·, 
to articulate a cost conscious attitude in their organisations. A 
culture of cost containment need to be established and top management 
have to t..ake the lead. Some top management perks may have to be 
reduced so as to ,give a clear message to the whole organisation about 
the need to be economical. 
To articulate a corporate culture requires a strong and com..~itted 
leader with a vision. Such a leader would articulate the oft.en 
unwritten values consistently for a long time until the organisat.ion~s 
thinking is aligned to cost consciousness values. 
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6_5 Leadership 
The success of the cost focus strategy would depend on the 
leadership provided for SADC airlines. The critical nature of 
management to ensure the turnaround of organisational decline was 
highlighted in Section 2.6. The critical nature of leadership was 
also confirmed in the study of successful turnarounds of BA (Vide 3. 2) 
and SAS (Vide 3.3) as well as in t.he study of a cons~st.ently 
profitable airline namely SlA (Vide 3.4). 
The study of BA., SAS and SIA showed that management must clearly 
state the mission of the airline. Management of these airlines 
clearly formulated appropriate goals and objectives for their 
airlines. These goals were clear., challenging and achievable. 
Management then came up with appropriate strategies to ensure that the 
goals or objectives of the airlines were achieved. 
SADC airlines can also formulate and implement succ-essful 
turnarounds and maintain profitability if the present top management 
is replaced by strong., competent leadership with a clear vision of how 
to turnaround the present poor economic and f ina.ncial performance of 
their airlines. They would need to come up with a clear mission and 
objectives which should be communicated effectively to the 
organisation~s personnel., shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Since the cost focus strategy appears to be the most viable 
turnaround strategy., the top management need to cultivate a culture 
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ail:·li-ra.es ope'l"ate ira.divir.hlally or i-f r..:r..ant'.;inerJ,/me'l"ged.L Tight l'"JJH.lgetr.s.ry 
systems to eTlB"'..l'l"e that r.;05-ts ~.'l"e within sper..:i-fied limits need to be 
Jlllt i"nto plar..:e withr.JJJ.t 8>!1.crif:icing .sr.s.fety r.;"t" r.s.cr..:ei:,table levels of 
.sta:-ndards of se-rvice_ A cultUTe o-f r..:r.Jst r..:r ..mscir . ro.sne.ss r:::a.n be enh.anr..:ed 
by encouraging and 'r"e"Oa"t'1"1ing per-sr.mr.el whr.J exr..:el in cr.r.ni.r~ up with 
ider.LS to cut costs_ 
Top management would need to ensure that production efficiency 
is achieved through efficient and effective airline scheduling and 
fleet planning to ensure the selection of the optimum number,. type and 
size of aircraft for airline operations as well as improving labour 
productivity.. Ser1.dce efficiency would also be necessary to minimise 
costs and would be achieved if top management come up with ways to 
increase load factors and revenue yields through the effective 
employment of the technique of yield management (Vide 2 .. 3.3). Cost 
efficiencies would be achieved through management ensuring that there 
is careful control on aspects like fuel costs {for example through the 
use of more modern,. fuel efficient aircraft),. negotiating to reduce 
user charges wherever possible such as airport and en route navigation 
charges,. the optimum choice of aircraft size and speed for a given 
route and optimum aircraft and crew utilization. 
Management would be critical in negotiating or facilitating SADC 
airline integration or cooperation among airlines,. for example,. in 
rationalising aircraft scheduling., shared facilities (ground equipment 
and training among others)., standardised aircraft purchases., joint 
marketing of services and so on. 
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l., . -·· .. ···-·---
enE..-uril:"Lg that all the elemt'fat .. s o"f the McKirlSey 7-S f-!"~rk a.re all 
aligned to the cost .. fo~~~.s st.rateg>J~ 
6~ 6 Cone lusians 
SADC airlines, individually or collectively, do not possess the 
information, human, material and financial resources to meet the 
intense and growing competition from the .. mega-carriers .. from Europe, 
USA and elsewhere in the intercontinental markets. The increasing 
moves towards deregulation and globalisation as well as the growing 
environmental (noise) lobby constitute formidable threats to SAI'IC 
airlines on intercontinental markets. It appears that SADC airlines 
can only survive and prosper if they confine their operations to 
regional (within Africa") and domestic markets. 
SADC airlines also need to drastically reduce their costs to the 
lowest possible while maintaining an acceptable level of .service. 
Cooperation among like-minded airlines within or outside SADC should 
result in significant cost savings. 
The various elements of the internal environment of SADC airlines 
also need to be aligned to the strategy of cost focus to ensure that 
the strategy is effectively implemented. 
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7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7 . 1 Summary 
SADC airlines are beset by several problems. These include heavy 
losses,. massive debts,. inadequate aircraft utilisation,. over supply 
of capacity,. overmanning,. low productivity,. inadequately skil~ed 
manpower,. lack of cooperation among SAI'C states and ageing aircraft. 
The average economic growth rates are generally low while population 
growth rate is higher than economic growth rate. Foreign currency is 
generally in short supply to finance imports of raw materials and 
capital equi~nt such as aircraft and associated ground support 
equipment. 
Some dynamic and profound political and social changes are taking 
place within SADC countries. There are widespre.ad moves towards 
democratic governments and institutions within the region. The wisdom 
of continually heavily subsidizing loss ~.aking institutions such as 
airlines are increasingly being questioned not only by donor agencies 
but also by the SADC population. It is against thi:s background that 
strategies to turnaround SADC airlines were being sought. 
A literature research was carried out in ~"hapter 2 to find out 
the ideal strategies to turnaround the poor economic and financial 
performance of SADC airlines. Three generic strate.gies described by 
Porter ( 1985 : 65 - "10") were identified which could be used by any 
firm in any industry to gain a competitive edge over rival 
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·Tue cost. leadership strategy seeks to a•::-hieve cost°l' production 
and market/ser-. dce efficiency. Cost efficiency is achiev·ed by hal.dng 
t.he lowest. possible cost for a gi"·en level of output {seat or tonne 
kilometres) at. a given le,..·el of customer service and the market 
income/out.put (passenger or tonne kilometres). Costs can be minimised 
by, among other things .. the use of modern fuel efficient. aircraft ... the 
optimum selection of aircraft size, speed and range (low costs \li."Ould 
be achieved by using larger aircraft on longer stage lengths at higher 
a'\l·erage speed) as well as optimum crew and aircraft utilisation. 
Product.ion efficiency can be achieved through efficient and 
effective airline scheduling. This invol\l·es striking .a balance 
between crew utilisation to ensure maximum productivity.. equipment 
maintenance designed to enable an even flow of maintenance work to 
ensure the efficient utilization of facilities while ensuring that the 
required aircraft are a'l.i·ailable for services and the use of facilities 
which should be adequate to meet the anticipated demand. 
Market or service efficiency is achieved by ensuring that 
adequate load factors and yields are realized to ensure profitable 
airline operations. 
A differentiation strategy requires SAI.~ airlines to offer 
customers something different fr-om competit>::>rs whi .. ~h the rivals would 
find difficult. to match such as the quality of service offered. SA!:.C 
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The literature research also re,l'ealed the critical nat.ure of 
management for the suC"Cess of any st.rategy. Turnaround strategies in 
various industries were spearheaded by strong,.. competent and committed 
top management who articulated appropriate strategies for their-
organisations. 
From the literature research it appeared that either t.he broad 
based cost leadership strategy or the cost focus strategy were the 
ideal strategies to turnaround SAI.'iC airlines. 
In the third chapter some airlines which carried out. suc-ce.ssf;ll 
turnarounds namely BA and SAS or which consistently maintainec 
profitable operations n.ame·ly SIA were studied. The study was meant 
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Chapter 2, Im.pr.Jrla:nt.. lessorf.S wt:::-t·e derived f'l"f'..an the study of the three 
airlines, 
The necessity for a mission as well as clear,. challenging and 
actionable goals was highlighted. The study of BA and SAS highlighted 
the need for strong,. competent and committed top management to ef feet 
successful turnarounds. The top management are responsible for,. among 
other things,. the formulation and implementation of the appropriate 
mission,. goals,. objectives and strategies to effect successful 
turnarounds. Management need to have a free hand in running the 
airlines which point to the need for a policy shift by SADC 
Governments to commercialise and ultimately privatise their airlines 
if profitability is to be achieved. 
The study of BA,. SAS and SIA showed that it is costly to adopt 
either the broad based differentiation strategy or the differentiation 
focus strategy. Huge financial resources may be required to,. for 
instance .. acquiring a modern fleet of aircraft (following the practice 
of SIA and BA),. extensive marketing of airline services and 
establishing an effective distribution system. SADC airlines., with 
their meagre resources,. may not be in a position to adopt the 
differentiation strategy. The cost leadership strategy,. either the 
broad based or focus strategy appeared to be the most "·iable for SADC 
airlines. 
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f.ield 
were disr..."Ussed. in Ches.pt.er 4. 
The st-.DG 
z·eplacing cs.geb:ig fuel i·ctefficie-rtt aircrr.1.ft with.in the Sl-.DG fleets 81'.lch 
as the Boeing 707s, DC--Bs and. DC-lOs with trtr..rce morle"t'n f1.lel efficie·nt 
aircI:·~.ft S"IJ.ch o.s the Boei·r.g 7137s, Boei"C~g 737-·ilOOs o:nd. 5fJOe ~.-nd MIJ-BOs. 
types in a fleet 1:1:nrl thrr ..111.gh er.;r ..mou~ies of sea.le which cr.r.J.ld r.a:·ise ii 
SADC- ah::· lines were integ1:·a:ted -r.;-r: if they c lr..:se br cr..:o:p-F.;fz·e.t..ed. Mr..i.rket 
excess ~.i-c:c"?.·o .. ft .. i.s of 
in the (Vide 5.4. L;::;.L efficiency would 
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13.chieved th.rr.sugh ef f ic:iernt a:etd ef fer..:t ive a.ir l i-rv::: E..-Cb.er.J:o.l i-r..g a.-ra.d r.i'j 
SADC 
intercr.tcit inera.tal rr.ro.tes. 
The McKinsey 7-S model was used in the fifth chapter to carry out 
the internal analysis of SADC airlines,. in particular,. Air Zimbabwe 
to reveal strengths and weaknesses. 
The following were the main strengths typical of SAI'C airlines: 
a. The bureaucratic structures typical of SADC airlines ensure 
that there are clear lines of authority and 
responsibilities,. clearly defined reporting structures,. 
unity of command and direction which engenders a sense of 
order, equity and di5Cipline (Vide 5.2.2.a). 
b. SADC airlines are members of IATA which allows them to 
participate in the co-ordination of technical standards and 
services with other airlines. They also benefit from 
training and technical assistance programmes {Vide 
5 't'"t) • .i:... ~.a . The airlines enjoy Go.,lernment support which 
negotiate bilateral agreements and shields the airlines 
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c. SADC airlines have adequatel1,t· t.rained and skilled personnel 
in .the technical and operational are.as with pilots,. 
engineers and technicians trained and licensed to 
international standards (Vide 5.2.2.b). 
d. Air Zimbabwe and most SADC airlines ha\t·e considerable 
computer capacity. This can be employed to produce 
information necessary for management. to perform their tasks 
and make effective decisions. There are .al.so opportunities 
for automatic ticketing systems typical of mega carriers 
and other airlines (Vide 5.2.2.d'). 
The analysis of the internal en1.dronment of SAIC airlines 
revealed several weaknesses. These include the following:-
a. Almost all SAI'C .airlines are government owned. The 
Governments appoint the Chief Executi,,.·e Officer,. often on 
:political grounds,. at the expense of the most appropriate 
person for the job. 
and bureaucratic 
communication and 
The organisational structure is tall 
hence lengthening the lines of 
frustrating the timely flow of 
information which is cri t.ical in the dynamic operating 
environments of airlin-es {\Hde 5. 2 .1.a). 
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-,·esr:.lts t .. he-r·e 
eff icie-r1.cy _ 
The 
timely~ 
!3ADf~. ~.irliries 
the 
( 1)). 
a.n-rma.l 
little 
... C.• 
........ 
r.;f 
to . i·.r1.crease 
MIS 
ir.;sses 
lack. of sk.iiis ~-,.,,J r.;,.,&.•.J. 
{Vide 5 .. 2 .. l e 
e. No particular style of management. appropriate to the SAI'C 
environment has been articul.ated. No particular CEO has 
proved to have the charisma., style., competence~ commitment. 
or strong enough to lead any one SAI.'tC airline to 
profitability from the present unsat.isf actor~· financial 
position {Vi de 5. 2. 1. f). 
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From the external appraisal of SAI.'(;~ airlines.,. it was evident that 
they face formidable threats al though there are also a number of 
opportunities which may be exploited by the airlines. 
include the following:-
The threats 
a. In the economic environment there is oversupply of 
capacity. Th-ere is increased competition from new entrants 
into SADC markets as well as existing .airlines which poses 
a serious threat to their viability. The better 
attractiveness of South Africa~ airports especially 
Johannesburg International Airport as major hubs have 
increasingly resulted in lower load factors and decreasing 
yields from SADC airlines (Vide 5.4.1.a). 
b. The majority of aircraft in the S..f\DC airlines fleet are 
ageing. This results in higher fuel consumption and 
maintenance costs. P.eplacing these aircraft with modern 
ones will require huge capital outlays. To be able to 
compete effectively? SAL'IC airlines need to invest in the 
prol.dsion of sophisticated CRS as. well as automated 
ticketing systems {Vide 5.4.1.b). 
c. The general social and political mo\1~ement within SADC 
states towards more democratic g"Overnments and insti t.utions 
has increasingl.!t r-esulted in the general public questioning 
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the tieed fr.sr the exist..e-r1.Ce r.sf airlirtes which are ·pe.rrceb1ed \ 
i?$..B ju.st t;eirtg F.f. drr.f.i·ca. r..rn the fisr."l.lS witb.ou:t discerctible 
bernefits to the J~.II~l;:.,.tir.s·ca. 6.t l7-f:r2.e- The exist..e·cl.Ce of. the 
air lira.es a'l"e, tl"te·E·Erfr.sre, threa.te-ra.ed u:ra.iess they ca.n justify 
thei'l" exist ..F.rca.ce by at ler.i.E.r-t bei·ctg prr.sf.itable withr.JJJ.t 
requiring any st.ate assista.:ra.r..:e {Vide 5_4_ Le)_ 
H1i'l"f"..;pe~m. '-1.:etd Nr.srlb. lun.erican m1.1.rk.et.s is also threa.tew!d r.r,; 
the mr.sve tr..Mards tbe ·caeed tr.> comply '.ffith ICAO An-nex 16 
of SADC airr..=raft are ageirag (Vide 5_4_1_d)_ 
for SADC sta.t .. es tr.s arlopt ope-ct skies i:'°licies- This 
threaterlB 
There are a.l.sr.s a rwm..1-rer r.sf r.sJiiporl ... 'm'dties which mb.y be exploited 
t"n SADC airliw~s em;Jlr..,7i·cag the r,;r.;st. fr.;r.."U.S stra.teg-;_ These i·ncl.u.de the 
follO"o<11ing:-
a. A policy shift by SADC Governments to relinquish control of 
airlines and perhaps allow them to be privatised presents 
several opportunities. They would be able to employ the 
most suit.able persons to be at the helm of the airlines. 
The top leadership would be able to employ appropriate 
strategies to turnaround SADC airlines. For example,. the!'~ 
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The la:r·ger ~.irline re~l.lti·c~ frr..r.a. me-rgers,. 1.:1.cqrJ.isiti(rets or 
ot .. h.et:· fr.J"t-m r.rf 1.:1.lli;l';f:ctees may be irs. a t.;ette'l· ;:'°sition to 
e lsewh.ere ~ 
o.irlira.e hr.J.s greater r.;heatees of beira.g viable cr.RKf~.red with. 
t .. r,, make ~rffective rler.;isir.;-ca:; Ol't l'rfrcd.m.isi"cs.g r.;osts (llide 
d. The prevailing social and political situation within SAIC 
characterised by economic and political liberalism is 
conducive to the enactment of legislation for policy 
changes which include commercialisation or privatisation of 
airlines as well as facilitating integration or closer 
regional cooperation. This should facilitate cost 
effective and profitable airline operations (Vide 5.4.2.c). 
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It.. wil!:l.s fcnrnd tha.t 
u-i.ark.ets. The r.J.irli·nes ·need tr--' significr.s:ntly rer.bx:e t..hei·c cr.;e..-t..s whiie 
The structure of SADC .airlines need to have fewer layers of 
management to facilitate CO!fidnl .. tnication. Some non producti ..,,,·e and 
unnecessary posts would need to be abolished. The cost focus strateg!-' 
need t.o be communicated to all airline personnel to ensure cost 
effective operations. Appropriatel··1l skilled personnel need to be 
sourced and adequately remunerated so as to benefit from increased 
productivity. 
reduce costs. 
Cooperation by airlines in training personnel would 
Airline boards need to be staffed by personnel of 
proven ability and competence who would be able to ensure that airline 
management undertake effecti"·e cost containment and 
enhancement programmes. 
Airline MIS should facilitate management decision maJ.:::ing bi.~ 
providing timely~ relevant~ adequate information cost effectively. 
A more participative style of management would be more appropriate to 
motivate personnel to effectively provide services at minimal costs. 
Management need to articulate cost con.sciousness values and attitude 
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The performance of SADC airlines is generally \;"ery poor. Despite 
the poor performance of SADC airlines, there is need for the airlines 
to meet the strategic,. social,. economic and communication needs 0£ 
SADC countries. Strategies to turnaround the unsatisfactory 
performance of SAI'C airlines were being sou~~t. 
The possible turnaround strategies are ~ost leadership,. 
differentiation and focus. The internal weaknesses and strengths of 
SADC airlines were analysed using the Mc-Kinsey 7-S framework. The 
internal organisational elements of structure,. strategy,. systems,. 
management st.yle,. staffing, skills and shared values ought to be 
aligned to the chosen strategy for the successful implementation of 
the strategy. 
A study ""'as carried out of two airlines which had successful 
turnarounds in the early 1980s namely BA and SAS. A studit of BA 
revealed the successful emploJ,"ID"ent. of the differentiation turnaround 
strategies. SAS,. on the other hand,. successfully employed the 
differentiation focus st.rategies. SIA,. one of the most consistentl:i,~ 
profitable airline in the world was also examined. ·The Airline 
.successfully consistently used the differentia~ion strategy. 
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....... _ 
An analysis r..sf t .. he :;=-ragmr.s.tir:.~ st ..ra:tegies r.sf SADC airliri.es r.s...e well 
the fr.1.ce well 
tectmologica.lly F.:1.r..Nanced ararl rela.tively bet..te"l"'~.ged. "mega-ca~·iers· 
frr...an Eurr.Jpe and elsewhere" h;r..r-e tr.s "fr..tr:..-ns their ef fr.srls to regio1·i.;:;.l a:nd 
dr.irtd'!:E.o-tic opei:·atir..m.s. They aught .. to oi~ril3.te "feeder services tr..t the 
pr.Merful compet i tr..t"l"'S "frr..,'ln r.Je-.oil'e lr..t-;~d nr.s.t iOl'lS, 
There is r1eed tr..t a.r..:hieve cost.. learlershiJJ thrr..ro.gh i~rr..sr..bJ:Ct io·n 
efficienay,. 110.:rr..et/SiSft~ice efficiew::y awl r..:r.;st. efficie·cl(;;y. Prr.sr.bl.ctir..m 
efficiel'l.CY is achie-..?ed thrr.mgh econr.a:aical,. efficient axul effective 
a.ii:· line sr:.:herlulirtg,. fleet pl.arming 1.fiul i·car..:reased l;:,hour -y-ror.h2cti".r-ity, 
W!l.bour prorluctivity r..:a--n be ilrq'"l:"t".JV"ed th-rr.sr....gh the redw:.:tir..m. of 
overr.w:s.nrdng: rer:.:r..l.itirag,. t-z:·r.s.i·ning a:carl reta.irdT1g r.;ompete1rt persr..rca.rael. 
Service efficienr ... 7 r..:a.ra. be achieved t .. h.~h. i"c~"Z"er.s..sirtg lor.1.d f;.i.r..:tr..t"l"s r.s:nrJ. 
improved revero2e yield.s. This is ;:,.chieved tb:rCfll.gb the emplr.symel"a.t of 
the tectmiqrJ.e of yield m.ar0.gement. ~Llsr.J excess aircra.ft.. ci!:fra. be sold 
"!l.nd the o l.der t:ue l unecr...m.omi.c aircr~:ft ca.ti t.;e ret irer.l. Cost 
efficie·ncy is re~.liz.ed thrr.mgh m.i·nmisi11g fuel cr.Jsts r.f'J' usi·ca.g fuel 
er.:onoudc a.ircrl!:f.ft,. r_,:;:stimisi-rtg ai~r..:"E"aft.. a:nd r.;"l"'eW l.xtil iz.r.s.t..ir.m,. aJN.J·ng 
o+ .. her t .. hings, 
Close SADC airline cooperation or integration would facilitate 
the effective employment of the cost focus turnaround strategy. Such 
cooperation or integration would benefit from economies of scale. 
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This cooperF.1.tir.J"n r.Jr irttegratir..m ru::ed l"tr.st il"Nr.slve F.$.ll SADC F.1.irlines, 
rftl:t ma.y be limited to sr.;me few lUte m.il"tderl airlines. 
For the r..:ost fr.sr.:r& tl.lrrti:f.rr.JJJ:nd strateg-,1 to be effectively 
implem.el"a.ted, the'E"e is l"teed fr.J't"' it tr.Jo be r.;r..R.a.,Plemented b-.1 inte't"'nal 
org13:nisatir.tnF.$.l restr:ir..:t1.lri·ctg tr.; el"u:ro:re th.F.1.t all th¥.:! elemei1ts r,;f the 
McKinsey 7-S f"l"amework. l"a.omely e,-trur..:t .. ure:, e.-t..rategy, stil;;l.ff, skills, 
systems, style 1:s:ctd. saperor<lirti:f..te gr.;F.:J.ls a.re F.$.ll F.$.ligned t .. r.s the cost 
focus strateg-,1 F.$I~l r~.st conflicting. 
They 
r.JE: able to motivate 1--ersr,,·cara.el F.:m.rl be Jll'l"eJ:r.1.red to t~.r..e the bold steps 
necessa't"",1 to achieve pt"r".JfitF.1.ble airlirte perfo~xa.ce. 
7.3 Becommendat ions 
The following are recommendations to turnaround the 
unsatisfactory performance of SADC airlines: 
a. SADC airlines ought to adopt the cost focus strategy. In 
this caae~ the airlines would seek to gain a sustainable 
cost advantage over competitors on regional and domestic 
routes (Vide 4.3.6). 
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6 .. 2 ~.rtrl 6 ... 3} 
c. SADC airlines ought t.o get into strategic alliances ... W.!.":.n 
advanced airlines in Europe,. America,. and Asia: or elsewhere 
so as to benefit from their sophisticated ~rJ.:::eting .a:::d 
t · " . {V. . 3 c. • "' .. ,) managemen ~ecnniques iae -~ ana b."" • 
d. SADC Governments need to effect some policy changes whic~ 
include commercialising and ultimatel.!l pri,,·atising SAI.'C 
· "' • ( ·n • de rt 5 ~•t 3 c. d .t ,.. rt ·i air.lines v-1 "-- • .iz,. .v an• "--~-.!.. 1 • 
e. SADC airlines need to identify and recruit strong,. 
competent and committed top management to spearhead and 
articulate a cost leadership strategy focusing on regional 
and domestic operation.~ (Vide 2.6.2 and 6.5). 
f. SADC airlines need to come up with clear mission statements 
and corporate goals,. which should be in keeping with a 
culture of cost consciousness and the need t.o be profitable 
{\Hde 3.5). 
g. Top management need to ensure that production~ 
market/service and cost. efficiency are realised (Vide 
4.2.2~ 4.2.3 and 4.2.4). This would result in the 
effective employment of the cost focus strategy. 
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h. It r.s.ll the 
a.lig-ned, is~ 
st.a.ff" skills~ 
( Vir.le 
{ 1) 
(2) 
(3) Skilled~ 
{ 4.) 
CEO, 
l.S 
~-,.,,,.;: 
.-..,.,, . ..,. 
'7_.-;-
< ,_, 
~,,.,.. • ..,.,,c, ... 
.... J .... ,.,, . ._. 
to 
cr..,-umi t te-rJ. 
(.5) Appropriate and effect.hre intern.al systems such as 
MIS~ accounting~ maintenance and quality control. 
{6) A participative styl·e of management. 
(7) A shared and accepted cost conscious culture. 
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ANNEX .. A .. 
Freedoms of the Air (Doganis 1992:347} 
First Freedom 
Second Freedom -
Third Freedom 
Fourth Freedom -
Fifth Freedom 
Sixth Freedom 
Seventh 
Freedom 
Eighth Freedom -
(Cabotage Rights} 
The right of a carrier from country A to fly over 
country B without landing. 
The right of a carrier from country A to land in 
country B for technical reasons such as 
refuelling,. but without the right to pick 1..1p or 
put down passengers/goods/mail {revenue traffic). 
The right of a carrier from country A to carry 
revenue traffic from country A to country B. 
The right of a carrier from country A to carry 
revenue traffic from country B to country A {An 
airline is almost always granted both third and 
fourth freedoms since they are complementary - an 
aircraft usually returns from where it came). 
The right of a carrier from country A to carry 
revenue traffic between country Band country C -
or any other countries - in both directions (This 
freedom is rarely granted to carriers in SADC as 
well as most countries of the world because it 
exposes the local airline(s") to the competition 
of some remotely based and possibly larger and 
more efficient airline(s}). 
"l"he use by a carrier f rorn country A of two sets 
of third .and fourth freedom rights to carry 
revenue traffic between other countries but using 
its base at A as a transit point. For example,. 
Air Zimbabwe could carry sixth freedom traffic 
between Maseru and Luanda via its base at Harare 
even though it has not been granted fifth freedom 
rights between Maseru and Luanda. Sixth freedom 
rights are not formally recognised in air 
services agreements. 
The right of a carrier from country A to carry 
revenue traffic between country B and country C 
without landing in the home country {A). 
The right of a carrier from country A 
to carry revenue traffic between two points in 
country B. Cabotage rights are seldom granted. 
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